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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three chapters on the network structure of the economy
and its macroeconomic consequences. In the first two chapters, I analyze the relationship
between macroeconomic volatility of individual countries and the international trade net-
work the countries are embedded in. In the third chapter, I study the international migration
network. In the first chapter, I show a regularity that European countries occupying more
central positions in the intra-Europe trade network exhibit lower macroeconomic volatil-
ity. Intuitively the trade network has a core-periphery structure and the core is more stable
than the periphery. This is puzzling because the core country is also more open to shocks
coming from all other countries, which increases volatility. This relationship is informa-
tive in the context of the unsettled, classic debate on whether trade openness increases or
decreases country-level volatility. Rather than considering an aggregate measure like trade
openness, the idea of centrality provides a more comprehensive measure of the nature and
strength of trade linkages as well as the identity of the trade partners, all of which have
important effects on volatility. I construct a multi-country, multi-sector model subject to
idiosyncratic productivity and liquidity shocks, and fully characterize the trade network
generated in equilibrium. I calibrate the model to the European Union and I show that it
viii
closely replicates the observed negative relationship.
Next, I extend the theory presented to incorporate a general network structure and its
effects on volatility. From an empirical perspective, I construct an instrument based on
geographic distance to establish the finding. From a theoretical perspective, I consider the
possibilities of missing linkages and stochastic weights in the trade networks.
The third chapter studies the European immobility puzzle. A theory of cross-country
migration is devised in the form of labor mobility based on regional and sectoral pro-
ductivity shocks in a multi-country, multi-sector setting. Differences across countries in
socio-cultural and institutional factors induce a friction on such labor reallocation process.
The model explains interstate migration network within the U. S. (frictionless benchmark)
well. When applied to Europe, the model predicts a sizeable missing mass of migrants.
Our estimates show this to be due to socio-cultural barriers.
ix
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1Chapter 1
Globalization of Volatility
1.1 Introduction
How does the number and identity of trading partners affect a country’s macroeconomic
volatility? The current global economy is reminiscent of a massive complex input-output
system comprising an intertwined set of countries producing goods and services, each im-
porting and exporting inputs and outputs to each other forming the network of trade. In
this chapter, I argue that the structure of the trade network as a whole is an important factor
affecting country-level volatility in the sense that the latter is a complex outcome of inter-
action between how a country dissipates idiosyncratic shocks to its neighbors and how the
spill-over effects from other countries propagated through the network affect the domestic
volatility. Thus I show that the dispersion in trade linkages in the network contributes to
the dispersion of cross-country volatility.
To study the structural features and the effects of the inter-country linkages, I consider
the following questions in turn. Is the international trade network relatively symmetric
across countries, or does it have an epicenter which plays a disproportionately important
role in the whole network? How does the asymmetry in connectivity if there is any, affect
the country-level volatilities? In particular, is there a systematic relationship between how
centrally positioned a country is in the network and how volatile it is? Finally, if a country
decides to open up, would it gain more by trading with a country which is peripheral in
the trade network or a country which is at the center of the network? A priori, the answers
to these questions are not obvious. There might be some asymmetry in the international
trade network. But is it enough to cause a dispersion in country-level volatility? Also, a
2country which has more connection than others is better suited to diversify its risk but at
the same time, it is more open to outside risk. Thus the net effect of openness on volatility
is ambiguous. As will be shown below, however, the answer to the first question is that
the actual inter-country trade network is far from symmetric; it resembles a star-shaped
network with some countries forming the core and the rest being peripheral. Given this
high level of asymmetry, it is seen that the core countries have a less volatile income
process than the peripheral economies. Finally, engaging in trade with a more central
country induces stability on the home country.
To understand the relationship between centrality of the countries and their correspond-
ing volatilities, I adopt a network theoretic point of view which emphasizes the nature of
trade linkages of the whole set of countries simultaneously rather than considering bilateral
linkages between pairs of countries in isolation from the rest of the world. Thus as opposed
to sheer volumes of trade, we show that what really matters for volatility is who are the
neighbors in the trade network, who are the neighbors’ neighbors and so on. The fact that
asymmetry in linkages has implications for volatility was put forward by Acemoglu et al.
[2012]. They argue in the context of an input-output model that in an economy compris-
ing many sectors with sufficient dispersion in intersectoral linkages, idiosyncratic shocks
of different sectors explain a substantial portion of aggregate volatility. Thus in a suffi-
ciently granular economy, the ‘diversification’ argument fails for the aggregate volatility
in the sense that idiosyncratic shocks do not cancel each other. An immediate precursor of
this idea can be found in the ‘granular hypothesis’ forwarded by Gabaix [2011] who shows
that if an economy is made of firms with sufficient dispersion in size, then again idiosyn-
cratic shocks do have an effect on aggregate volatility. I take a step further and explain
why different nodes in a granular economy might show different levels of volatility in the
first place, in response to similar external shocks. More precisely, I construct a theoretical
3model to show that the skewness of the linkages in the trade network explains the differ-
ences in cross-country volatility in a world with ex-ante symmetric islands1 subjected to
symmetric, idiosyncratic shocks and an exogenous and fixed trade network.
From the perspective of a single country embedded in a trade network, the network
approach allows me to study the diffusion of domestic idiosyncratic shocks across the
neighbors and aggregation of foreign shocks. This aspect of the model is close to the traffic
jam theory of recession proposed by La’o [2014]. Any imbalance in one country sends
ripples of economic activities through the linkages to its neighbors in the trade network.
However, as opposed to cyclic networks considered in the traffic jam model, I allow any
arbitrarily complicated network. More precisely, I construct a model of multiple islands
connected to each other forming a flow network of a primitive asset that is payed to settle
current account surpluses or deficits. The theoretical model thus endogenously generates a
weighted and directed flow network defined over a set of countries mimicking the nominal
trade flow network. This feature of the model provides a micro-foundation to the cross-
sectional primitive asset holding network proposed by Jackson et al. [2013] who analyzes
propagation of shocks through the linkages of a network with arbitrary structure. The
analysis of individual country’s volatility is based on a canonical dynamic neo-Keynesian
model with liquidity constrained agents (as in Midrigan and Philippon [2011]) and sticky
prices (Calvo [1983]).
In the model, I consider a set of islands endowed with differentiated tradable goods and
produce non-tradable goods. They also hold a non-consumable liquid asset, the supply of
which is fixed from outside. For simplicity, let us call it money. As an example, imag-
ine that island A gets an endowment of apples, island B gets an endowment of bananas
and the endowment processes are i.i.d. across islands. Each island is inhabited by unit
1In the rest of the paper, I will use the words island and country interchangeably.
4mass of households who supplies labor and capital to produce housing service which is
non-tradable. The preferences of households are defined over a bundle of tradables and the
non-tradable goods. Thus products differentiated according to their origin along with pref-
erences defined over them provide incentives to trade. Finally, the households are liquidity
constrained, the total amount of liquidity being the amount of liquid asset the households
have and the revenue generated from selling their products (Apples and Bananas) in the
international market. Now, if island A runs a current account surplus by exporting more
than it imports, then there will be an inflow of the liquid asset to maintain zero balance of
payment. This relaxes the liquidity constraint for island A and tightens the same for island
B. Assuming prices are sticky in the non-tradable sector i.e. housing, demand will increase
in the island A and decrease in island B. Thus labor employment, wage rate, rental rate,
output will show movements in opposite directions.
I extend this basic framework in several steps. First, the whole setting is made dynamic
along with capital formation in the domestic economy allowing the usual consumption-
smoothing mechanism to work. Second, the model incorporates N ≥ 2 islands allowing
us to consider the effects of diversification of export portfolio. Third, the trade linkages
are allowed to have arbitrary weights. Note that given the structure of the model, the
trade network will be a function of the preference parameters i.e. the relative weights
the countries assign to each others’ tradables. I calibrate the trade network generated in
equilibrium to the actual trade network. Thus the centralities of islands are pinned down
from the relative weights of the trade linkages.
The role of the liquid asset in this model is to keep track of the nominal value of
exports and imports as well as the nominal expenditure on domestic production. The nom-
inal flow of traded goods across islands can be expressed in terms of this asset only as it
is the numeraire of this world. Therefore, the trade flow network representing the nominal
5value of exports and imports across islands can be rewritten as a set of interdependent flow
equations representing the law of motion of the liquid asset-holding. Any exogenous liq-
uidity shock in the form of helicopter drop of money induces an imbalance in the relative
asset holding and thus “waves” of adjustments takes place sending ripples of macroeco-
nomics activities across islands. In real time such adjustments could be simultaneous, but
such a framework is useful in analyzing how shocks propagate across countries based on
the strength of the trade linkages and to potentially identify the islands which if shocked,
induces a longer wave of adjustments through the network.
The main results are summarized as follows. First, the model endogenously generates
an inverse relationship between centrality of countries in a trade network and their cor-
responding income volatility. This result hinges on a result that the more central islands
accumulate a larger stock of liquid assets. Intuitively, a large fraction of fiscal stimulus
in Greece will eventually end up in Germany as the latter is more central than the for-
mer (we are of course, ignoring other considerations like debt obligations here). To see
why this is the case, let us assume that all of the countries are maintaining zero trade
surplus and there is a non-degenerate distribution of liquidity across countries. By giv-
ing a stimulus, the receiving country suffers from an imbalance and when trading with its
neighbors, redistributes a part of the additional money. The neighbors will also do the
same in the next round of trading as now they have some excess money. Eventually more
central countries, by virtue of being important suppliers to other countries, will receive
the biggest share of the pie. Thus due to trade, countries experience liquidity inflow or
outflow which entails fluctuations in liquidity available to be spent on domestic purpose
(non-tradables like housing service for example). Given liquidity-constrained households
and sticky prices, international trade will thus impact real consumption as prices cannot
adjust quickly enough to nullify the effects of the changes in the stock of liquidity. Cor-
6respondingly, the effects are seen in all other country-specific aggregate real variables viz.
wages, labor supply, rental rate, and capital holding. Since central islands hold larger
stocks of liquidity, idiosyncratic and identically distributed liquidity shocks will induce
smaller percentage changes the growth rates of the stock and consequently induce lower
macroeconomic volatility. Thus the mechanism leads to asymmetric responses across the
countries due to asymmetries in the trade network itself, even though all countries can
have similar conditions in the domestic labor market or the commodity market.
Second, the local effects of diversification still holds true. In the earlier case, we talked
about centrality as a global measure of importance in the trade network and showed its
equivalence in terms of asset holding. This basically describes the endogenous robustness
of the islands in response to shocks. A complementary effect is present that an island
with well diversified export portfolio also shows less volatility in income. The intuition
is that with a well diversified portfolio, the islands are better equipped to reduce volatility
by combining exogenous liquidity shocks coming from its neighbors. As will be shown
below, the openness of an island also matters in the sense that a high exposure to shocks
contributes positively to its volatility. But both of these effects are of second order impor-
tance compared to the first effect of centrality-liquidity relationship.
Third, a series of experiments on some specific regular networks gives important in-
sights into the mechanism of shock propagation (Sec. 1.4). I show that with a symmet-
ric trade network, all things unchanged, greater trade integration reduces macroeconomic
volatility. Note that in a symmetric network, all islands are equally central. Thus the cen-
trality channel does not work here. By having more trade linkages, countries can reduce
volatility conditional on zero effects from centrality. This point requires clarifications.
On the empirical ground, the literature provides ambiguous evidence on existence of a
negative relationship between trade openness and volatility (see Sec. 1.7.2 for details).
7However, a less ambiguous point is that there actually is a negative relationship condi-
tional on the portfolio being well-diversified (see for example Haddad et al. [2012] and
Caselli et al. [2014]). Thus it is not the trade openness per se, that has a unidirectional
effect on volatility. A disaggregated measure like the multilateral openness or in other
words, the topology of the whole trade network, gives the correct description of the effects
on volatility.
Note that with unequal degree of connectivity, both the centrality and diversification
channels would work. If we consider a star-shaped network with one node forming the
core and the rest being peripheral, then the later would show higher volatility than the for-
mer in response to similar liquidity shocks. Finally, I study how liquidity shock propagates
from one island to another using a linear network. With a general network structure it is
difficult to pin down the “wave” of adjustments as there can be multiple paths connecting
any two islands. With a linear network (a chain of islands) we can circumvent that prob-
lem. In terms of impulse response functions it is seen that a unit liquidity shock to one
end of the chain sends a ripple across the network as the receiving island holds a fraction
of the additional money and transfers the rest to the downstream island due to trade which
then becomes the new receiver. As expected, the further we move from the origin of the
shock the lesser is its effect in terms of macroeconomic adjustments it causes.
1.2 Empirical motivation
There is substantial variation in macroeconomic volatilities across countries (e.g. the most
volatile country is more than four times more volatile than the least, in the sample). Sta-
bility associated with low volatility is of utmost importance for a multitude of economic
issues2 making it a central concern from a policy-making perspective, in developing and
2For example, Ramey and Ramey [1995] finds effects of volatility on long-run growth, Barlevy [2004]
links welfare loss to volatility and Prasad et al. [2007] finds important effects, both direct and indirect, on
8developed countries alike. Fiscal, monetary and other related policies are often designed
to insulate the economies from external disturbances or at least, to reduce the degree of
fluctuations caused by such disturbances. Hence, understanding the key mechanisms gen-
erating or influencing macroeconomic volatility is important both from a theoretical and
a practical point of view. To explain the cross-country differences in volatility, Giovanni
and Levchenko [2012] argue that due to the interaction between trade and granularity in
the economy, bigger economies show less volatility. On the other hand, Koren and Ten-
reyro [2007] show that volatility is also related to stages of development. Economies with
higher per-capita income tend to fluctuate less due to modes of specialization in produc-
tion. Here, I propose a complementary thesis that in a densely interconnected world, the
relative weights of such connections has an important effect on country-specific volatility.
Dispersion in trade linkages are evident in Fig. 1.1 which plots the intra-Europe trade
network showing compositions of the import baskets of the countries. Clearly some coun-
tries are markedly different in terms of presence in their neighbors’ import baskets than
others. Such skewed distribution of trade linkages poses an advantage and a disadvantage
for smoothing out idiosyncratic shocks. Intuitively, a central country has more opportuni-
ties to diversify its exports reducing volatility whereas the same country is also more open
to exogenous shocks which increases volatility. Fig. 1.2 shows the pattern in the actual
data that a more central economy has a more stable income process indicating that cen-
trality has an unambiguously negative effect on volatility. Fig. 1.2 presents a scatter plot
of log volatility against log of eigenvector centrality for the European countries. Volatility
is defined as the standard deviation of detrended (HP filtered) log per-capita GDP.
I use the recursive definition of centrality that one country’s centrality is the weighted
sum of all of its neighbors’ centralities3. Thus intuitively, if the home country has a bigger
poverty.
3Google’s PageRank algorithm is probably the most well known application of eigenvector centrality
9trade linkage with a more central country then centrality of the home country increases.
Hence the home country should show more stability following the pattern in Fig. 1.2.
This finding is consistent with and rationalizes the regularity found by Farshbaf [2012]
that trading with more stable country induces stability on the home country. Empirically,
it is seen that the effect of centrality on volatility is negative whereas the standard aggrega-
tive measures like trade openness are not very informative (Sec. 2.2.1). A similar finding
is made also by Gray and Potter [2012] with a bigger set of countries. But in that case,
it is not clear whether such a finding actually reflects a systematic relationship between
the trade centrality and volatility or it arises due to differences in levels of development
of financial markets or due to size effects. In general, the countries which are very cen-
tral also happen to be very large and often with fairly developed financial markets thus
making it difficult to disentangle their effects on volatility. To deal with that problem, I
construct an instrument based on geographic centrality of the countries in the European
Union and the trade centrality is instrumented by that variable. Trade centrality is still
seen to have an effect on volatility (Sec. 2.2.1). Another way to motivate the impact of the
cross-country linkages on the country-level volatility is that it implies non-trivial spill-over
effects whereas country-specific explanations cannot generate such effects.
We can formally define a network and the associated centrality index as follows.
Definition 1. A network is a pair G ≡ (N,T ), T is an N × N adjacency matrix defined on
the set of nodes4 N, where Ti j indicates the strength of relationship between nodes i and j.
A network is directed if T is asymmetric i.e. Ti j , T ji ∀{i, j}, and is undirected
otherwise.
Definition 2. Eigenvector centrality5 A of a network (N,T ) is the eigenvector associated
with the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix T .
4I also denote the cardinality of set N by N.
5The centrality score of a node i is defined as ai = 1λ
∑
i∈G Ti ja j where λ is a constant. By rearranging and
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Figure 1.1: Trade network of the European Union. The arrows show the directions of nom-
inal flow of trades in goods and services across the network. The thickness of the arrows
show the relative weights that the importing countries attach to the exporting countries in
their respective import baskets.
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Figure 1.2: Log of volatilities (standard deviation of detrended log per-capita output) of
countries in Europe is plotted against log of eigenvector centrality of the countries in the
intra-Europe trade network. See text for definitions.
The export-import table serves as the basis of construction of the adjacency matrix T
(see Appendix 1.7.3 for details) for plotting Fig. 1.2. See Table 1.5 for a list of names
of countries with their abbreviations. Similarly, from the export-import table we can con-
struct a measure of first-order centrality i.e. that takes into account of different countries
presence in their respective trading partners’ import baskets. Thus, if country i supplies
Ti j ≥ 0 fraction of its j-th partner’s total import, then first-order centrality is defined as∑
j Ti j. Note that the usual idea of considering the number of trade partners (commonly
termed as ‘degree centrality’ of a node) is of no help here as every country trades with
every country albeit with different intensities.
We can go ones step further and construct a measure taking into account not only direct
neighbors but also neighbors’ neighbors. Here, we first calculate the direct presence of the
expressing it in terms of vector, we get TA = λA, which is evidently the solution of eigenvalues of matrix
T . It is also known as Bonacich centrality (Acemoglu et al. [2012]).
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i-th country in its neighbors’ import baskets as described above. Then we remove the i-th
country from the network and compute its neighbors’ first-order centrality in the reduced
network N/{i} and combine it with the i-th country’s presence in the respective countries
import baskets. Thus this is a measure of second-order centrality. As can be seen in both
panels of Fig. 1.8, The relationship between both measures of centrality and degree of
volatility is unambiguously negative.
1.3 The model
Consider a set of N islands that trade with each other. Each island produces non-tradable
and differentiated tradable goods6 and is populated by unit mass of households which
consumes both a bundle of tradables and non-tradables and derives utility from leisure.
The only means of payment by the household are provided by the central monetary au-
thority. This nominal liquid asset imposes a constraint on the purchasing power of the
households and hence creates the demand for the asset. As in Midrigan and Philippon
[2011], this model can be interpreted as a large country with multiple states (for example,
USA, China or India), or more appropriately, a monetary union with a collection of coun-
tries (for example, European Union) even though none of the results crucially depend on
this assumption. We ignore country-to-country labor migration in the present formulation.
Thus the production processes are spatially separated (Dumas [1992]).
1.3.1 Sequence of events at time t
Following the standard exposition of models with a cash-in advance constraint, we assume
that each household has two members, one shopper and one producer. At any generic
6The assumption that products are differentiated, at least from the consumers’ perspective, according to
their country of origin is called the Armington assumption (Armington [1969]).
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time-point t, the following sequence of events takes place. At the beginning of the period,
each island gets stochastic endowments of a country-specific tradable good and a non-
consumable, tradable nominal liquid asset. The implicit idea is that the money market
opens first and the central monetary authority engages in open market operations providing
the households with a stochastic endowment of nominal assets. As far as the tradables are
concerned, we assume that islands have comparative advantages in production of a unique
commodity and hence, each country specializes in only one tradable good. But preferences
are defined over all tradables which provides incentives to trade. At the next step, the
international market opens to carry out trade between islands. The pre-existing stock of
asset and the new additional assets along with the nominally evaluated tradables is the
aggregate liquidity available to the households, which they decide how to split between
consumption of tradables and non-tradables (Clower [1967]). The shopper trades in a
perfectly competitive international market. This leads to an inflow or outflow of liquidity
depending on whether the she runs a trade surplus or deficit. The balance of payment
equation holds i.e. trade surplus equals net asset flow. Then she goes to the domestic
market to purchase non-tradable goods. At this point, the producer wakes up and goes
to the domestic labor market and earns wage and rental income after providing labor and
capital (as the households are also the capital-owners). The intermediate goods producers
combine labor and capital to produce a continuum of intermediate goods which are, in
turn, bundled into the final good. Thus the households also earn a net profit from producing
intermediate goods which is accounted for in the flow budget constraint.
Fig. 1.3 provides a visual description of the sequence of events. An assumption we
make which simplifies the model a lot, is that tradables are consumed in the same pe-
riod either because they are perishable or used as intermediates to produce something else
that is consumed immediately. One can think of agricultural goods, fisheries, hotel and
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Figure 1.3: sequence of events at any generic time point t.
transport services or mining products like natural gas, coal, oil etc. as examples of trad-
ables. On the other hand, capital accumulation is possible only with non-tradable goods
and the capital is fixed, island-specific capital. For example, construction, finance, real
estate service or public services (building schools, hospitals or roads) are non-traded due
to their very nature. In short, one can think of commodities like ‘apples’ and ‘oranges’
being the tradables and ‘housing’ being non-tradable. An alternative interpretation is that
the tradables are intermediates that are bundled in each country and then consumed (see
Sec. 1.6).
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1.3.2 Household behavior in the i-th island
Let us define an utility function of the a representative consumer of the i-th island7,
Ui =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
(
αiv1(CFi (t)) + (1 − αi)v2(Ci(t)) − B¯iLi(t)
)
, (1.1)
where CFi is the composite consumption good that is bought from the international market.
Ci denotes consumption of the domestically produced goods and finally, Li denotes labor
provided by the household8. There are two constraints that the households face. First, there
is a liquidity constraint (cash-in advance constraint) on the household. The aggregate stock
of liquidity consists of pre-existing stock of liquidity (ai(t − 1)), additional endowment of
liquidity in form of transfer payment (∆aexoi (t)) and appropriately priced tradables, which
the household spends on domestic and foreign consumption (Ci(t) and CFi j(t) ∀ j ∈ N re-
spectively) goods. Finally, there is a flow budget constraint that keeps track of trade-off
between present versus future consumption (in the form of capital Ki(t + 1) and real bal-
ance). The relevant constraints are as follows:
Pi(t)Ci(t) +
N∑
j
PFj (t)C
F
i j(t) = ai(t − 1) + PFi (t)YFi (t) + ∆aexoi (t),
Ki(t + 1) +
ai(t)
Pi(t)
= wiLi(t) + riKi(t) + (1 − δ)Ki(t) + ξi(t). (1.2)
There is nominal friction in pricing and I will introduce it by considering a sticky
price model in a monopolistically competitive production sector for the non-traded good
(i.e. ‘Housing’). Given the market structure, there will be a profit from owning the firms
that will accrue to the households. The profit ξi(t) has been accounted for in the flow
7Islands/countries are nodes of the trade network.
8The parameter, B¯i = (1−αi)B so that the elasticity between non-tradables and labor remains unchanged
even if the relative weight assigned to tradables and non-tradables change across islands. Thus the domestic
consumption-labor trade-off remains independent of the trade pattern.
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budget constraint. Note that capital accumulation is done only through domestic, non-
traded good. This assumption simplifies the analysis considerably.
1.3.3 Supply side of the i-th island
There are two production processes in each of the islands; one for the tradables and the
other for non-tradables.
1.3.3.1 Endowments of tradables
The process for tradables are simple viz. we assume an exogenous stochastic endowment
process for the tradables. The endowment processes are assumed to be symmetric across
the islands. Thus they do not contribute to cross-country variation in income. The non-
tradables have a more complicated production process and can be used to produce capital
stock or used as a consumption good.
We follow a sticky-price model (a` la Calvo [1983]) of the supply side of the non-
tradables where there is a perfectly competitive final goods sector and a monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods sector. The final goods sector bundles the intermedi-
ate goods following a standard technology with Dixit-Stiglitz specification. Intermediate
goods are produced with capital and labor supplied by the households. The households are
also the firm-owners and with monopolistic competition, the profits will accrue to them.
1.3.3.2 Non-tradable good: final goods firms in the i−th island
We assume that there is a unit continuum of firms (indexed by κ ∈ [0, 1]) supplying in-
termediate goods to the final goods producing firms in each island. Also each of the inter-
mediate goods is different from others making the intermediates imperfectly substitutable.
There is set of competitive, final goods producing firms that uses a bundling technology to
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bundle the intermediate goods into a final good. The technology is given by the following
constant elasticity of substitution bundling function:
Yit = [
∫ 1
0
Yit(κ)
ψ−1
ψ dκ]
ψ
ψ−1 , (1.3)
with ψ > 1. A profit maximizing final goods producing firm will choose to maximize
piit = PitYit −
∫ 1
0
Pit(κ)Yit(κ)dκ, (1.4)
subject to the above bundling technology. As the final goods market is competitive, this
profit has to be zero. By solving the problem (see Appendix 1.7.6.4 for a detailed deriva-
tion of the price index), the aggregate price index of the final good, is given by
Pit = [
∫ 1
0
Pit(κ)ψ−1dκ]ψ−1. (1.5)
1.3.3.3 Non-tradables: intermediate goods producing firms
The production function of the intermediate firm producing κ-th variety is given by the
usual functional form
Yit(κ) = λt (Kit(κ))θ (Lit(κ))1−θ , (1.6)
where all firms receive the same productivity shock, λt. We assume that each firm has a
constant probability ρ of keeping the price unchanged and (1 − ρ) of optimally resetting
the price. It can be shown that the firms that will reset the price would choose the same
new price irrespective of their history. Thus the aggregate pricing equation is given by (see
Appendix 1.7.6.4 for a detailed derivation of the dynamic pricing equation),
(Pit)1−ψ = ρ
(
Pi,(t−1)
)1−ψ
+ (1 − ρ) (P∗it)1−ψ , (1.7)
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where P∗t is the optimally chosen price by the firms that have the chance to reset their price.
The optimally chosen price will reflect the gross mark-up over the of the intermediate
goods firm κ’s ratio of the present discounted values of streams of nominal costs and
outputs. This price dynamics captures the stickyness imposed on prices by the existence
of firms without the opportunity of resetting the prices every period.
1.3.4 Equilibrium configuration
Now we can describe the equilibrium in the economy as follows.
1. The households in the i-th island (for all i ∈ N) maximizes their lifetime utility
subject to their respective liquidity and budget constraints.
2. Firms maximize their profits in all islands by optimally choosing labor and capital
inputs.
3. The market for internationally tradable goods clears.
4. The market for liquid assets clear.
5. The markets for the domestic final good (i.e. the non-tradables), intermediate goods
(used in production of the final goods), labor and capital clear in all island.
To solve the model and get a closed-form solution, we make the following assump-
tions. The consumption bundle is assumed to have Cobb-Dauglas type form and the utility
functions are logarithmic i.e. with unit elasticity of substitution, viz
1. v1(x) = log(x) and v2(x) = log(x),
2. CFi =
∏N
j (C
F
i j)
βi j s.t.
∑N
j βi j = 1.
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These functional forms allow us to disentangle the domestic market (that is the market for
non-tradables) from the international market (the market for tradables). In what follows, I
first solve the model assuming non-stochastic preferences with a complete trade network
i.e. where every island trades with all other islands. Later I extend the model to incorporate
the cases of missing trade links and stochastic preferences.
The choice variables are consumption of tradable goods (CFi j for j = 1, . . . ,N), con-
sumption of domestic good (Ci), labor input (Li(t)), capital holding next period (Ki(t + 1))
and liquidity demand for next period (ai(t)). The first-order conditions can be derived (see
Appendix 1.7.6.1) easily giving us the trade-off between present and future consumptions,
1
β
= E[
wi(t)
wi(t + 1)
(ri(t + 1) + 1 − δ)],
B
wi(t)Pi(t)
= E
( β
Pi(t + 1)Ci(t + 1)
)
.
(1.8)
Once the dynamic trade-off is pinned down, we can study the static decision of al-
locating liquidity to consumption of tradables versus non-tradables. As in Midrigan and
Philippon [2011], asset holding evolves endogenously across islands. First, the same ref-
erence points out central monetary authority cannot possibly control the allocation of liq-
uidity across locations within a country, and this is even more true for sovereigns within
an monetary union. More importantly, in the present context, the islands will accumulate
or reduce the nominal asset holding based on their preferences over non-tradables which
determines the trade patterns across islands. Thus the liquidity holding is determined en-
dogenously. In the later section, we show that not only it is intimately related to the trade
matrix but also captures the centrality index very easily.
Now, we can state the first result concerning liquidity flow.
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Proposition 1. In absence of any exogenous shock (preference or liquidity), the flow of
liquidity across the islands is governed by a system of linear equations, A(t + 1) = TA(t)
where all elements of the transition matrix T are positive and T is column-stochastic
that is the column-sums are 1. This matrix T also captures the trade network across the
islands.
The transition matrix T is the analogous to the Leontieff inverse of an input-output
structure (as in Acemoglu et al. [2012], for example). The crucial difference is that it
describes the linkages of the demand side whereas the Leontieff inverse describes the link-
ages of the supply side of the economies. Due to unit elasticity between consumption of
tradable and non-tradable goods, the liquidity flow equations can be written independent
of the domestic variables. Under such specifications, it turns out that the flow equations
are also free of the stochastic endowment processes for the tradable commodities (see
Appendix 1.7.6.3 for full details of the derivation). Consider the following matrix which
includes all parameters of the utility functions of all islands,
Q =

α1β11 α2β21 . . . αNβN1
α1β12 α2β22 . . . αNβN2
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
α1β1N α2β2N . . . αNβNN

.
The set of equations describing the liquidity flow (A = (a1, a2, . . . , aN) denotes the stocks
of liquidity) can be written succinctly as a first order stochastic process
A(t + 1) = T (A(t) + Aexo(t)) where T = (D1−α + D1−α(I − Q)−1Q), (1.9)
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where Dx is a diagonal matrix with elements of vector x along the diagonal. Note that
D1−α is a diagonal matrix of which the diagonal elements are the weights assigned to non-
tradables in the utility functions of the islands. The first term on the right hand side of
the above equation shows the flow of liquidity across islands and the second term shows
the exogenous injection of liquidity in the system (by the central monetary authority).
Thus we have a set of first order difference equations describing the system-wide flow of
liquidity. Evidently, in absence of the exogenous injection of liquidity, the dynamics is
given by A(t + 1) = TA(t) as has been claimed in the above proposition.
To prove the second part, note that all elements of matrix Q are positive and the column
sums are less than one. A standard result from matrix algebra is that in such a case,
(I − Q)−1 exists and contains positive entries only (see e.g. Simon and Blume [2007],
Theorem 8.13). Hence, all elements of T are positive. Finally, note that in absence of
liquidity shocks the flow equation (Eqn. 1.9) has to be satisfied along with the identity that∑
i ai(t + 1) =
∑
i ai(t) for all {ai(t)} ∈ RN+ . In order that this conservation rule for aggregate
liquidity is satisfied at all time points with all possible vectors of liquidity holding, the
transition matrix T must be column stochastic. The intuition is that T behaves likes a
Markov chain redistributing the existing stock of liquidity across islands.
Thus T is a well defined transition matrix which captures the relative weights that the
islands assign to products of all islands as is evident from Eqn. 1.9 that T is an ensemble
of the parameters of the utility functions of all islands. Since it captures the propensity
to trade of individual islands with their respective neighbors, we calibrate it to the actual
trade matrix. The interpretation is that T being column-stochastic, {Ti, j} represents the
relative weights (of liquidity flow) that island j assigns to all other islands {i}. This vector
of weights can be found from actual (nominal flow) data on import basket of the island j.
Note that flow of money would be opposite to flow of goods. Hence, outflow of money is
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equivalent to inflow of goods i.e. imports.
1.3.5 Dynamics of the model
To study the dynamics of the liquidity flow, I first characterize a system with no exogenous
injection of liquidity (Aexo(t) =
−→
0 for all t). Note that if the islands have fixed, time-
invariant (non-stochastic) preferences, then the transition matrix T is time-homogeneous.
However, we can extend the result to stochastic transition matrices as well which will be
discussed later. First, we consider global convergence for non-stochastic transition matrix
T .
Proposition 2. Consider a set of N islands such that the ∀ ∈ i, ai(0) ∈ R++ and let us
assume their interaction is described by A(t + 1) = TA(t) with all possible pairs of islands
trading. In absence of exogenous addition of liquidity, this dynamical system is globally
stable and it has an unique fixed point. The rate of convergence is exponential.
To prove this proposition, we will use the following proposition from linear algebra.
Proposition 3. (Perron-Frobenius theorem) If all entries of a n × n matrix are positive,
then it has a unique maximal eigenvalue. Its eigenvector has positive entries.
Note that for a stochastic matrix, the maximum eigenvalue is 1. Thus the system
converges to its corresponding eigenvector. Thus the dynamics shown by T has the same
convergence properties. The intuition of the proof is very simple. Observe that in absence
of addition of liquidity, this mechanism only reshuffles liquidity over the islands. Hence,
the columns of the transition matrix must add up to 1 making it column stochastic. Then
we apply Perron-Frobenius theorem to derive all the results stated in the above proposition.
Such long-run convergence of money holding among separated agents (spatially or in
some other way), has also been noted other papers. For example, Williamson [2008] shows
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such a result in a model with segregated goods market with a set of agents connected to
the financial institutions and a set of agents trading with the first group but unconnected to
the financial sector. The ‘trickle down’ mechanism is similar in both the cases.
Note that the transition matrix T also gives us a network representation of the liquidity
flow where each element of the matrix corresponds to the weight of edges existing between
nodes (islands). This observation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The eigenvector centrality of the trade matrix is identical to the liquidity
holding vector A∗ in the steady state.
As has been shown above, the dynamical system given by Eqn. 1.9 converges (in
absence of any external shock; see proposition 2) asymptotically to an unique fixed point,
say A∗. Thus in the steady state,
A∗ = TA∗, (1.10)
which implies that A∗ is the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of the tran-
sition matrix T . Therefore, A∗ is also the eigenvector centrality of T by definition. Since,
T captures the whole information of the trade matrix, we can calibrate it to the original
export-import matrix and the eigenvector centrality found for the trade matrix (plotted in
Fig. 1.2) can be matched by the solution of the dynamical system given by Eqn. 1.9
(without the shock).
The model allows us to capture the endogenous resilience of the islands to external
liquidity shocks by the levels of liquidity held by them as well as by virtue of being posi-
tioned at the core, the islands can aggregate shocks coming from peripheral islands. Note
that proposition 4 shows that a more central island holds a higher level of liquidity. There-
fore, if the external shocks are generated from the same distribution, an island with higher
centrality would show lower fluctuations in response to the shock as opposed to a less cen-
tral economy. This is the first order effect. Proposition 5 shows that a centrally positioned
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island fluctuates less from external shocks as it has the advantage of aggregation. These
two effects work together to reduce volatility of the core islands relative to the peripheral
islands. This is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Consider a set of N islands such that their interaction is described by
A(t + 1) = T (A(t) + Aexo(t)) with all possible pairs of islands trading and the exogenous
shocks are i.i.d. Also assume that the domestic labor markets, final and intermediate goods
markets are described by identical deep parameters in all islands. Then the volatility of the
macro variables of an island are proportional to the volatility of growth rate of liquidity
induced by the exogenous shocks. The variance of growth rate of liquidity stock of the i−th
island in turn, is
(1) proportional to the variance of the exogenous liquidity shocks σa,
(2) inversely proportional to the square of eigenvector centrality a∗i and hence depends on
the structure of the network T
(3) an increasing function of size of the network N, product of average share si of the
island in the supply chain and the network-wide Herfindahl index H, and finally variance
of the export portfolio σ2Ti .
The following expression shows the fluctuations in the real variables in terms of the
structure of the network and the shocks:
σvi ∝ σgi ,
=
√
N
(
σa
a∗i
) √
σ2Ti + si.H, (1.11)
where σvi denotes the fluctuations of the real variables viz. output, consumption, invest-
ment, wage and rental rate (all coming from the non-tradable sector). First, the positive
relationship between volatility of money growth shocks and volatility of real variables are
expected can be seen easily by considering the linearized system of equations describing
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the evolution of real variables in response to liquidity shocks (listed in Appendix 1.7.6.5).
The relationships between fluctuation in nominal asset levels and those of real variables
are linear in the sense that a bigger liquidity shock induces bigger fluctuations in real vari-
ables. Rest of the proposition depends on two broad channels. Proposition 4 (which shows
that more central economies would hold bigger stock of liquidity and hence would show
lower fluctuations in response to identical shocks) shows that central economies would
show lower fluctuations in real variables. This is a first order effect. The second order ef-
fects arise due to the aggregation of liquidity shocks of downstream islands (to whom the
island is exporting goods and hence receiving money from) as has been discussed above.
The final level of volatility comprises both the effects.
A proof is given below. First I show that differences in volatility of domestic economies
are what creates the differences in aggregate volatility across the islands. Note that by
definition, real GDP of an island i is defined as the sum of consumption, investment and
net export evaluated at some fixed prices ({P¯}), that is
GDPi = (P¯i.Ci +
∑
j
P¯Fj C
F
j ) + Ii +
P¯Fi (YFi −CFi ) −∑
j,i
P¯Fj .C
F
j
 ,
= P¯i.Yi + P¯Fi .Y
F
i . (1.12)
Thus assuming i.i.d. process for the endowments of tradables (w.l.o.g. assumeσYFi = 0 ∀i),
the volatility of real GDP evaluated at the domestic price is σYi . Therefore, the volatility of
the domestic income process is what differentiates the volatility of the aggregate income
process across the islands. From Appendix 1.7.6.5, we know that in a loglinearized system
the volatility induced on the real variables are proportional to the liquidity shocks given to
the system. So the next step is to show why and how idiosyncratic liquidity shocks have
different effects across islands.
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From Eqn. 1.9 we can write the growth rate of the liquid asset of the i−th island as
gi(t + 1) =
∑N
j=1 Ti ja j(t)
ai(t)
+
∑N
j=1 Ti jaexoj (t)
ai(t)
. (1.13)
Therefore, the variance of the growth rate conditional on the current holding of liquidity is
σ2gi
∣∣∣∣∣
ai(t)
=
σ2a
a2i (t)
N∑
j=1
T 2i j where σa is variance of the i.i.d. shock,
= N
(
σ2a
a2i (t)
) (
σ2Ti + T¯i
2)
, (1.14)
where T¯i = ∑ j Ti j/N is the average share of island i in the downstream islands. The
second term can be expanded further by dividing and multiplying by the sum of squared
individual shares,
∑N
i=1 T¯ 2i which is also the Herfindahl index H. Thus we get
σ2gi
∣∣∣∣∣
ai(t)
= N
(
σ2a
a2i (t)
)
(σ2Ti + si.H), (1.15)
where si is the share T¯ 2i /
∑N
i=1 T¯ 2i of the i-th island and H is the network-wide Herfindahl.
Therefore, around the steady state the liquidity holding converges to the a∗i where a
∗
i is the
eigenvector centrality of the i-th island and we get Eqn. 1.11. This completes the proof.
Example 1. A completely symmetric network: If we have a transition matrix with Ti j =
1/N ∀ i, j ∈ N, the standard deviation shows the usual √N scaling as in the central limit
theorem (see Acemoglu et al. [2012] for a parallel result in the production network),
σgi =
1√
N
σa
a∗
where a∗ is the common centrality. (1.16)
Note that the centrality vector {a∗} is invariant to any scaling. We multiply it by N to make
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it comparable to the system size. Thus, we get
σgi =
1√
N
σa. (1.17)
Example 2. Auturky: If T is an an identity matrix In×n, the above formula shows that
σgi = σa which is the standard one-country model. (1.18)
Example 3. Expansion of the network: To show the effects of an increase of size of the
network, consider a fully connected, symmetric network Ti j = 1/N for all i, j ∈ N. Clearly
if we add another another island to the network keeping it symmetric, one can directly
apply Eqn. 1.17 to find that
σgi =
1√
N + 1
σa. (1.19)
Another way to derive the same would be to consider Eqn. 1.11. By increasing the size,
there is a direct effect on volatility as the first term increases from
√
N to
√
N + 1. But
by the same addition, we reduce the individual share si goes down from 1/N to 1/(N + 1)
and the same happens with the Herfindahl H indicating that inequality is reduced. The net
effect of increasing size and reducing inequality finally boils down to an overall reduction
of volatility.
Example 4. Central sector: This example shows that the negative effects of centrality on
volatility can be exactly offset by positive effects of more openness. Consider the following
the network
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T =

T1 T1 · · · T1
T2 T2 · · · T2
...
...
. . .
...
TN TN · · · TN

.
Note that the dominant eigenvector is { T1,T2, . . . ,TN}. To make it comparable to the
network size, we multiply the vector by N. Therefore, the volatility is given as
σ2gi =
σ2a
N2.T 2i
N∑
j=1
T 2i , (1.20)
which can be rewritten as
σg1 =
1√
N
σa for all i ∈ N. (1.21)
Thus it is the symmetry in the export portfolio that generates the usual central limit the-
orem. Note that this example covers Ex. 1 above. Assume that T1 > T2 > . . . > TN .
Clearly, a more central country is also more open as it has a higher share in the down-
stream countries’ import baskets. Note that the variance of the export portfolio is zero for
all. Thus the centrality effect is exactly offset by openness.
Next, we discuss the effects of Friedman’s rule of constant money growth in the current
context. Consider the equilibrium vector of liquidity holding A∗ without any exogenous
liquidity shock. Clearly, the individual countries hold potentially different levels of liq-
uidity a∗i . The injection of liquidity adding to the already existing stock is given by a
stochastic multiplicative process,
ai(t + 1) = gi(t + 1)a∗i . (1.22)
As long as the the ratios of liquidity-holding across islands before and after the injec-
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Figure 1.4: Different types of trade networks: (i) Dense (below) vs. sparse (above), (ii)
core-periphery (star), and (iii) linear.
tion are identical (that is ai(t + 1)/a j(t + 1) = a∗i /a
∗
j for all islands i, j ∈ N), there will be
no flow of liquidity between the islands. Hence there will be no spill-over of effects across
islands. This is formalized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6. If the growth rates of liquidity across the islands are exactly identical
(gi(t) = g j(t) ∀i, j and t), then there will be zero flow of liquidity across the set of islands
described above and hence there will be no transmission of monetary shock from one
island to another. However, if this knife-edge condition is violated, monetary shocks will
be transmitted across islands and will have real effects.
Thus island-specific Friedman rules generate spill-over effects except in the case of
identical growth rates.
30
1.4 Examples: volatility on some symmetric networks
An important dimension of the problem is to study the magnitudes of effects on volatility
as a function of the network structure.
1.4.1 Volatility of the islands: dense versus sparse networks
Below we consider two path-connected networks with four nodes each, one fully con-
nected and the other does not have the internal edges (see Fig. 1.4, panel (i)). The reason
we need at least four nodes is that with less than four nodes it is impossible to draw a
sparse network with symmetric connections between nodes. In both cases, the nodes (is-
lands) are described by an identical set of parameters (shown in Table 1.4). Consider the
following symmetric transition matrices:
T d =

1/3 2/9 2/9 2/9
2/9 1/3 2/9 2/9
2/9 2/9 1/3 2/9
2/9 2/9 2/9 1/3

,T s =

1/3 1/3 0 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3 0
0 1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 0 1/3 1/3

.
T d shows a symmetric dense network where all edges exist whereas T s shows a
symmetric sparse network which forms a cycle (undirected) with missing edges between
nodes. Fluctuations of the variables can be compared to see the effects of the changes in
network structure. A comparison with single island case is also provided (see Table 1.1).
Note that if an island is completely disconnected from the rest of the graph, then it has
no scope of dissipating the fluctuations. On the other hand, by being connected to other
islands, two opposite effects take place. The island is no longer immune to fluctuations
of its neighbors, but it can also mitigate fluctuations by transferring its own shocks to its
neighbors. Given a fully connected (dense) network, shocks are dissipated better than on
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Table 1.1: Standard deviations of endogenous variables on sparse and dense networks (see
Fig. 1.4, panel (i)).
Type Y C K H w r
Auturky 0.0174 0.0049 0.0085 0.0256 0.0051 0.0270
Sparse 0.0121 0.0046 0.0072 0.0164 0.0046 0.0174
Dense 0.0110 0.0043 0.0068 0.0144 0.0044 0.0153
Table 1.2: Standard deviations of endogenous variables on a core-periphery network (see
Fig. 1.4, panel (ii)) with identically distributed shocks.
Type Y C K H w r
Core 0.0104 0.0043 0.0067 0.0132 0.0043 0.0141
Periphery 0.0118 0.0045 0.0070 0.0150 0.0045 0.0160
a sparse network where some of the possible edges are missing. This is evident from the
table showing standard deviations of the real variables (output, consumption, capital, labor
hour, wage and rental rate). But overall, effects of trade integration is beneficial in terms
of volatility. For simulation purpose, I have used the values given in Table 1.4 except for
standard deviation of liquidity growth shock which is set to 0.00135.
1.4.2 Star network
Next, we consider a core-periphery network structure (see Fig. 1.4, panel (ii)). More
precisely, we assume there is one economy at the core of the network and there are three
economies at the periphery i.e. the core trades with all the peripheral economies whereas
the peripheral economies do not trade amongst themselves. Table 1.2 shows the volatility
of the corresponding macro variables. Evidently, the core fluctuates less compared to the
periphery. This is not surprising as we have already seen that a more central island should
fluctuate less. However, two effects are working here. The central economy A gathers
more liquidity and hence the liquidity shocks are lower in percentage terms. At the same
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Table 1.3: Standard deviations of endogenous variables on a core-periphery network (see
Fig. 1.4, panel (ii)) with proportional shocks.
Type Y C K H w r
Core 0.0113 0.0043 0.0068 0.0150 0.0043 0.0160
Periphery 0.0134 0.0045 0.0072 0.0178 0.0045 0.0188
time, it is better diversified which also contributes to lower volatility. To suppress the
effect of centrality, we can give proportional liquidity shocks to the economies. Thus only
the diversification channel works and still the core fluctuates less than the periphery (see
Table 1.3). Due to bigger shocks volatility increases for all variables.
1.4.3 Spill-over effects
In this section, I show how the effects of a shock spread across the network via the spill-
over effects of liquidity due to trade. Any injection of liquidity in a fully connected net-
work, will have immediate repercussions on the domestic markets of all islands. However,
if we consider a path-connected network, then the spill-over effects are clearly not imme-
diate. This can be best describe by considering a linear network (a chain).
For simplicity, we assume that there are 4 islands forming a linear network (see Fig.
1.4, panel (iii)). We give a small growth rate shock at the left-most node of the network
and study the impulse response functions of domestic macro-variables of all islands for
describing the spill-over effects. From Fig. 1.5, it is evident that the shock sends a ripple
through the network and the further the island is from the source of the shock, the lesser is
the effect on the variables in terms of magnitudes of fluctuations. In a very large network, it
will be interesting to see the extent of the spill-over effects which we ignore for the current
purpose (see Sec. 1.7.7 for a discussion on spill-over effects in statistically different large
networks).
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Figure 1.5: Shock propagation in a linear network (see Fig. 1.4, panel (iii)) : impulse
response functions of a 0.01 liquidity growth rate shock to the left-most node A. Up-left
panel: shock hits island A. Up-right panel: the second island B in the chain is affected at a
unit time lag. Down-left panel: the third island C is affected at two units time lag. Down-
right panel: the fourth island D receives the shock at three units time lag. This shows a
clear description of the time-delayed propagation of shock from the source throughout the
network. Another important point to notice is that the further the shock travels from the
origin, the weaker it becomes in terms of degree of fluctuations it creates.
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In the next section, we calibrate the model and study its quantitative implications.
1.5 Quantitative results
So far we have described the flow of nominal assets on the network. As the households are
liquidity constrained, any such inflow or outflow will have repercussions in the markets
for non-tradables. To analyze the extent of these effects in details, we log-linearize the full
system of equations (see Appendix 1.7.6.5 for the original set of equations and 1.7.6.7 for
the log-linearized version of the same) describing the domestic market and the behavior
of the system around the steady state can be discussed. Note that there are two possible
sources of fluctuations: liquidity shock and productivity shocks. We consider that all
islands receive identically distributed productivity and liquidity shocks (proportional to the
liquidity holding of the least central island to ensure that the shocks are small enough so
that log-linearization is meaningful). Due to asymmetries in the connectivities of different
islands in the trade network, the islands will hold different stocks of liquidity in steady
state (given by their respective eigenvector centrality; see proposition 4). Thus similar
liquidity shocks will induce different responses across islands.
Unless otherwise mentioned I use the parameters as described in Table 1.4 to solve for
the domestic economy for all islands. Fig. 1.6 shows the simulated volatility of islands
(described by equations in Appendix 1.7.6.5) by calibrating T to the trade matrix. All
islands receive identically distributed productivity and liquidity shocks. The first one con-
tributes equally to volatility of all islands whereas the liquidity shock affects the islands
very differently as countries with lower centrality show more fluctuations. Next, we plot
the simulated volatilities and first order and second order (Fig. 1.9) centralities. In all
cases, the negative relationship prevails (see Sec. 2.2.1 for empirical justification). For
the list of names of the countries with abbreviations used in the figures see Table 1.5. Six
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Table 1.4: Values of the parameters describing the islands. The standard deviation of the
growth rate shock has been calibrated to match the average volatility of income of the
sample of countries.
Description Parameter Value
Disutility parameter B -2.5805
Discount factor β 0.99
Rate of depreciation δ 0.025
Share of capital in output θ 0.36
Degree of price stickyness ρ 0.75
Mark-up factor ψ 11
St. dev. of TFP shock σy 0.00178
AR(1) coeff. of TFP shock γy 0.9
St. dev. of liq. growth rate shock σ¯a 0.04
AR(1) coeff. of liq. growth rate shock p¯i 0.5
countries have been dropped due to their marginal presence in the trade network.
1.5.1 Working of the model
The following three steps allow us to understand the negative relationship between cen-
trality and volatility.
1.5.1.1 More central islands are more liquid
This comes directly from proposition 4. To understand this result, one can think of the
following experiment. Consider N islands connected to each other with varying weights
of edges. Time is discrete. Introduce some Dollar bills on those islands. At each point of
time, each Dollar bill chooses one of its neighboring islands to move to with probability
proportional to the weight of the respective edges i.e. connections. If this system is allowed
to evolve, over time the distribution of Dollar bills settle down to a particular distribution
which can be described as the steady state distribution.
Such a distribution has two properties. First, the distribution itself is pinned down by
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Figure 1.6: Log of simulated volatilities of countries in Europe is plotted against log of
eigenvector centrality by calibrating intra-Europe trade network.
Figure 1.7: Model diagnostics: volatility of output from real data and simulation are plot-
ted along with a straight line with slope 1 (thin red line). The fit of the model with data
has a slope of 1.77 (thick green line).
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the edge-weights i.e. the probabilities that were used to move the Dollar bills from one
island to another. Second and more important for our purpose is that the number of bills or
the amount of money in each island will be proportional to its centrality. In other words,
a more central island will accumulate a larger number of bills. This feature is also seen in
case of bank to bank lending scenario and has been studied in e.g. Bech et al. [2010].
1.5.1.2 Bigger liquidity shocks generate bigger responses
The way liquidity growth rate shock affects each island follows a standard mechanism.
Consider the log-linearized domestic flow budget constraint (see Appendix 1.7.6.7 for the
full set of log-linearized system of equations)
Y¯Y˜t + (1 − δ)K¯K˜t − K¯K˜t+1 − a¯P¯ a˜t +
a¯
P¯
P˜t = 0, (1.23)
where the index for the i-th island is dropped for clarity. Note that prices are sticky and
the period t, the capital stock is given. Hence, any positive growth shock to assets will
lead to an increase in output to maintain the equality. Since, capital is fixed, this must be
the result of an increase in the labor force. Therefore, wages must increase to attract more
labor. A larger labor force increases the marginal product of capital and correspondingly
leads to an increase in rental rate as well. Since nominal assets are neutral in long-run,
the whole process is accompanied by a gradual catch-up process of price so that in long-
run the economy returns to the stationary state. The important point to note is that the
whole domestic side of an island is segregated from the other side of the island (which
engages is foreign trade) except through the channel of assets. Thus any foreign trade
leads to inflow/outflow of assets through an island which has repercussions in the domestic
economy by altering the available liquidity. Since the network structure determines how
liquidity flows through the islands, the same eventually determines how the islands (i.e.
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their domestic side) respond to the liquidity shocks.
1.5.1.3 More central island fluctuate less
Combining the above two mechanisms, we see that a more central island fluctuates less.
The diversification argument in Eqn. 4 also holds true. But in real data it is over-shadowed
by the centrality. We have carried out regression exercise to explain volatility of three
macroeconomic variables viz. output, consumption and capital formation as functions of
standard explanatory variables like trade openness, credit to GDP ratio, value of stocks
traded as a fraction of GDP, ratio of FDI to GDP along with liquidity available and cen-
trality. As can be seen from Table 2.1, more central economies do fluctuate less and the
economies which are more liquid, they also tend to fluctuate less. If we incorporate size or
GDP in the regression, then the exercise becomes insignificant due to high correlation of
size with centrality. Therefore, we use an instrument to disentangle the effects of central-
ity on volatility. Specifically, we construct the geographical network across the countries
considered and construct the geographic centrality index of all countries (see Mayer and
Zignago [2011] for details on the source of data). This index is used as an instrument for
trade centrality. The underlying idea is that geographical advantage imparts trade advan-
tage. On the other hand, it will be orthogonal to size of the economy. Table 2.3 confirms
the claim that centrality is negatively related to volatility. The results are quantitatively
similar with robust standard errors and sample size adjustments.
1.5.2 Fit of the model
I have plotted model’s prediction with real data in Fig. 1.7. As can be seen from the figure,
the slope of the fit is 1.77 whereas in the ideal scenario the slop should be equal to 1.
The average volatility is matched across the islands by calibrating the liquidity growth rate
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shocks. Given the higher slope, we see that the the model predicts a bigger spread of cross-
sectional volatility. Peripheral economies show more volatility than their counterparts in
the data and the core countries show less volatility is there in the data. Thus the model
captures the negative relationship well even though it does not replicate the exact slope
between centrality and volatility.
1.5.3 Cross-sectional distribution of assets
Due to the assumption of the cash-in advance constraint the model implies quantity theory
of money. Since the model generates a liquidity flow network across a set of islands, in
equilibrium the model implies that per-capita nominal GDP is equal to per-capita stock of
liquidity. Thus the quanity theory holds at cross-section i.e. an N-country version of the
quantity theory is obtained (see also Midrigan and Philippon [2011]).
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Figure 1.8: Exploration in actual data. Panel (A): Log of volatilities of countries in Europe is plotted against log of first-order
centrality of the countries in the intra-Europe trade network. Panel (B): Same plotted w.r.t. second order centrality.
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Figure 1.9: Simulation results. panel (A): Log of simulated volatilities of countries in Europe is plotted against log of first-order
centrality of the countries in the intra-Europe trade network. Panel (B): Same plotted w.r.t. second order centrality.
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Note that by summing over liquidity constraints for all islands in equilibrium, we have
PC = Atot, (1.24)
where Atot is the aggregate liquidity in circulation, C is the aggregate consumption of
non-tradables and P is a suitably defined price index. Since consumption is endogenously
determined as a function of output (through the consumption-savings trade-off), we can
rewrite the above equation as
PY = AtotV, (1.25)
where Y is the aggregate output and V is the velocity of money, defined as inverse of
average propensity of consumption. Since the model implies a flow network of money
across the islands, we can give a network theoretic interpretation of velocity.
Expected velocity of money To pin down the velocity of money, we can again think
of a collection of N islands. Let us begin with the smallest bit of liquidity (e.g. a Dollar
bill) transferred to one island in a fully connected, finite network with constant edge-
weights described by an ergodic Markov chain T . Note that the bill essentially performs a
asymmetric random walk on the network. Then the expected return time (the time required
to come back to a particular island j starting from the same) is
τ j j ∼ 1a j (1.26)
where a j is the j−th element of the corresponding stationary distribution (of T ). Let j
be an island (node) and c j denote the expected number of steps to visit every island of
the network starting at j, also known as the cover time. In general, we can provide the
following bounds on the cover time. For a general trade network with N islands defined
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by the Markov chain T ,
c j ≤ 4N × E, where E is the number of edges. (1.27)
Since for a dense network, E would be in the order of N2, the cover time would be 4N3.
In some special cases, the bound is tighter (see Appendix 1.7.8).
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that centrality of an economy in the trade network has an
important effect on macroeconomic volatility. It provides a complementary approach to
the existing literature on determination of volatility.
I have used the standard neo-Keynesian DSGE framework to model the domestic econ-
omy of each individual country. These countries taken together constitute a flow network
of liquidity. A Calvo-type staggered-pricing set-up is used in the form of nominal friction
to generate the long response time of the macroeconomic variables. The additive separa-
bility of the tradables and non-tradables in the utility function allows me to disentangle
the international market from the domestic market. Thus their dynamics can be studied
separately. It has a huge implication in the sense that effectively any inflow/outflow of
liquidity due to trade in the international market changes the liquidity available to be spent
in the domestic economy. At the global level, total supply of liquidity is determined by an
exogenous body (the central bank). Below I discuss validity of several assumptions made
in the model and possible extensions of the model.
In the present paper, the network is generated from the demand side. Due to the as-
sumption of differentiated products indexed by their origins and preferences defined over a
bundle of tradables, we can express the trade network as a function of the parameters in the
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utility functions only. Thus it is complementary to the input-output approach which gen-
erates the network from the parameters of the production functions (see e.g. Acemoglu
et al. [2012]). However, we can easily interpret the model in terms of an input-output
framework. Think of the tradables being intermediate inputs and the countries trade those
intermediate inputs in a perfectly competitive international market. Assume that each
country has a domestic technology that can bundle those intermediate inputs costlessly
and convert it into a final, non-storable consumption good which the household consumes.
Thus the flow network will be in terms of importing and exporting raw materials. The
same framework as has been discussed above, can be used to model that scenario except
that the parameters of the bundling technology in the production function proposed above
will describe the network instead of the same in the utility function.
The asset side of the model is simple. There is one internationally tradable nominal
asset in the model. Note that in addition I have also considered domestic capital stock
which allows households to smooth consumption streams. Introduction of internationally
tradable bond would make the problem intractable to solve as the portfolio determination
becomes problematic in the present formulation. It is beyond the scope of the present
work. Also, the presence of a single nominal asset (as opposed to country-denominated
nominal assets) is a simplifying assumption allowing us to circumvent the problem of
exchange rate determination in case of multiple currencies. An alternative interpretation
of the model in case of countries not having a common currency, is that we consider vehicle
currency which is issued by a third party but used widely in trade e.g. Dollar. Another way
to see the model is to consider multiple currencies with fixed exchange rates and perfect
substitutability between the currencies. An extension of the model can be considered with
imperfectly flexible exchange rates so that the friction causes changes in liquidity holding
of countries due to a liquidity shock. However, the underlying structure of the model
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would remain the same as has been considered above.
Finally, in a recent contribution Jackson et al. [2013] consider cross-holding of debt
in a setting close to Eqn. 1.9 augmented with nonlinear features and studies cascading
failures due to shocks. The model presented here is linear in nature allowing for complete
description and hence is useful for studying spill-over effects. Thus it provides a com-
plementary approach to studying the problem of spill-over effects through linkages across
countries.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Abstract
European countries occupying more central positions in the intra-Europe trade network
exhibit lower macroeconomic volatility. This empirical finding is puzzling because a
more central country is also more open to exogenous shocks which increase volatility.
To explain the negative relationship, I study a multi-country, multi-sector model subject
to idiosyncratic productivity and liquidity shocks, and fully characterize the trade net-
work generated in equilibrium. When the trade network shows skewness in terms of trade
linkages between different countries, similar liquidity shocks generate different levels of
repercussions across the network. First, the conventional effect of diversification holds true
that countries with better diversified portfolio fluctuate less compared to its counterparts.
Second, I show that a more central country holds more liquidity, and hence it is more ro-
bust to exogenous shocks. The combined effect dominates the opposite effect that a more
central country is also more exposed to shocks which contributes positively to volatility.
The model calibrated to the European Union generates and closely replicates the negative
relationship between centrality of countries in the intra-Europe trade network and macroe-
conomic volatility of the corresponding countries. The theoretical model is then extended
to capture the possibilities of sparseness and stochastic weights in the trade networks.
Keywords: Macroeconomic volatility, Centrality measure, International trade, Markov
chain.
JEL classification: E32, E41, F44, F62.
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1.7.2 Relation to the literature
This paper is related to three strands of research: (i) the newly established macroeconomic
models with explicit network structure and non-trivial, asymmetric interaction between
the elements of the network, (ii) monetary economics (iii) effects of trade on domestic
macroeconomic volatility. The recent boost in the explicit application of the network the-
ory to explain macroeconomic volatility started with Acemoglu et al. [2012]. This study
showed that the industries in U.S. are far from equal in terms of connectivity to other in-
dustries. Technically, the degree distribution has been showed to have a fat (power law)
tail thus indicating significant asymmetries in the ability to dissipate or propagate idiosyn-
cratic shocks. This phenomenon provides a basis to explain aggregate shocks arising from
such microeconomic shocks. An immediate precursor of this idea can be found in Gabaix
[2011], which showed if the firm size distribution has a fat tail i.e. described by a power
law, then the idiosyncratic shocks to the firms explains a large fraction of the total fluctua-
tions. These contributions marked a prominent departure from the earlier way of modeling
with their emphasis on the asymmetries at the level of economic organizations or entities
and provided a resolution to the debate of whether organizational linkages are important
(see Dupor [1999] and Horvath [1998]). However, it is not clear whether it is the extreme
differences in size (as in Gabaix [2011]) or the connectivity (as in Acemoglu et al. [2012])
that matters most for explaining volatility, as it is difficult to differentiate between these
two effects since larger economic entities usually have larger connectivity as well. This
problem has been discussed in the context of macroeconomic volatility induced by inter-
national trade on countries, as well (see for example Giovanni and Levchenko [2012]).
One possible way out to disentangle the effects is to consider cross-correlation between
the macro-variables of countries. If it is only size-driven then that does not imply anything
about the macro-variables being correlated. On the other hand, given the level of comove-
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ment of macro-variables across countries, the spill-over effects of international trade (Kose
et al. [2003]) constitute a better explanation.
The present contribution takes the network theoretic point of view on volatility pro-
posed by Acemoglu et al. [2012], but differs in focus. As opposed to explaining why dif-
ferent nodes contribute differently to aggregate fluctuations, I explain why different nodes
may show different levels of volatility because of the asymmetries in connectivity. In re-
lated contexts, the characteristics and implications of such large scale economic networks
have been investigated extensively9. For example, Oberfield [2013] and Chaney [2014]
studied endogenous evolution of the input-output network and export-import network, re-
spectively. The effects of multilateral linkages between firms on a have been studied by
Jackson et al. [2013] and Bigio and Lao [2013] which shows non-negligible effects on
aggregate dynamics. Kelly et al. [2013] analyzed a model of firm volatility based on
customer-supplier connectedness to explain common movements in firm-level volatility.
Ghiglino and Goyal [2010] studied formation of equilibrium prices, allocation and wel-
fare in a trade network of agents with exogenous endowment processes. An important
finding of their work is that a single statistic of the network viz., centrality, turns out to
be the crucial factor in determining the agent-specific equilibrium outcomes. This is also
featured in the present model and I show that there is a one-to-one relationship between
centrality and macroeconomic volatility.
The effects of trade integration on volatility is inconclusive (Burgess and Donaldson
[2012]). While studies like Cavallo and Frankel [2008], Bejan [2006], Martin and Rey
[2006] shows empirically and theoretically that trade reduces volatility, there are other
studies including Giovanni and Levchenko [2009], Easterly et al. [2000] with the opposite
conclusion. Interestingly, considering multilateral exposure (instead of bilateral exposure
9For economic applications (mostly microeconomic), see Vega-Redondo [2007], Goyal [2009], Jackson
[2010].
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which lumps everything apart from the home as foreign) in terms of the network struc-
ture reveals a negative relationship. To capture this pattern, I have used a multi-country,
multi-sector dynamic model with liquidity constrained households in style of Midrigan
and Philippon [2011]. However, since we are using a discrete set of islands as opposed
to a continuum of islands assumed in Midrigan and Philippon [2011], the dynamics of
liquidity across the economy can be pinned down explicitly and is shown to be intimately
related to the structure of the trade network. The demand for liquidity is motivated by a
constraint a` la Clower [1967] and frictions in price-setting behavior is motivated by im-
posing a sticky-price structure following Calvo [1983].
On the monetary side, this paper closely follows the cash-in advance literature (Lu-
cas [1980]). In the recent years, the classical quantity theory of money has received a
renewed attention, both in theory and practice. The theory of monetary business cycle
propounded by Christiano et al. [2005] has been used to study unconventional monetary
policies by Gertler and Karadi [2011] and Curdia and Woodford [2010]. Midrigan and
Philippon [2011] shows that real activities across regions within U.S.A. are very sensitive
to liquidity shocks and not to credit shocks. They also show that the quantitative easing
policy has reduced the effects of the recession considerably. The present paper builds on
that argument to show that such expansionary monetary policy would have differential im-
pacts on macro variables if the regions have skewed trade connections. Williamson [2008]
also studied a similar monetary transmission channel across agents differing in connection
to the source of money creation.
1.7.3 Constructing the centrality index
The export-import statistics is obtained from the Eurostat database (Eurostat [2011]). I
construct an N×N matrix (N being the number of countries/nodes in the network) denoted
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by T¯ with elements T¯i j indicating the how many millions of Euro’s worth of goods and
services were exported from the i-th country to the j−th country in a particular year. I
fill-up the diagonal elements by the respective country sizes (GDP-net export). The matrix
thus constructed takes into account both size and the trade relations. Then I normalize the
matrix column by column so that each column now sums up to 1. This step gets rid of
the units in which the trades are recorded and also, with this normalization the maximum
eigenvalue turns out to be exactly 1. Thus the eigenvector centrality is unambiguously
defined.
1.7.4 Data sources
The export-import data of the countries have been taken from Eurostat [2011]. Two sets
of data are provided there: on dispatches and arrivals. Arrivals, i.e. imports from other
EU countries, are particularly under-estimated due to misreporting of the corresponding
countries. Hence, there are discrepancies between the data. Officially, Eurostat considers
dispatches to be the most reliable gauge of Intra-EU trade and we also follow the same
rule. Data on GDP, consumption and gross capital formation in the Euro-countries have
been downloaded from Eurostat database (both yearly and quarterly). Data on money
supply, total stocks traded, credit to private sector and FDI are obtained from the World
Bank database.
1.7.5 Simulating the model
The steps for solving the model is listed below.
1. Solve for the consumers’ static problem of the i−th island of allocating money be-
tween consumption of tradables and non-tradables (Sec. 1.7.6.1). Using the assump-
tion of market clearance for all tradable goods, one can solve for the money demand
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Table 1.5: List of abbreviations of country names.
BE Belgium EL Greece LU Luxembourg RO Romania
BG Bulgaria ES Spain HU Hungary SI Slovenia
CZ Czech Republic FR France MT Malta SK Slovak Republic
DK Denmark IT Italy NL Netherlands FI Finland
DE Germany CY Cyprus AT Austria SE Sweden
EE Estonia LV Latvia PL Poland UK United Kingdom
IE Ireland LT Lithuania PT Portugal
and hence the linkages (Sec. 1.7.6.3).
2. Thus one gets the liquidity flow equation A(t+1) = TA(t) (see Eqn. 1.40). Calibrate
T to the actual trade flow matrix.
3. Start with an arbitrary vector of liquidity holding A(0). Simulate the liquidity flow
sufficiently long to get convergence of asset holding. Call the equilibrium asset-
holding A∗ where A∗ = TA∗ .
4. Solve for the consumers’ dynamic problem of the i−th island of consumption-savings
decision (Sec. 1.7.6.1). Solve for the producers’ problem in the i−th island (Sec.
1.7.6.4).
5. Construct the list of equations describing the i−th economy and log-linearize it
around the steady state (Sec. 1.7.6.5, 1.7.6.6, 1.7.6.7). Thus one gets a system
of equations that describes the fluctuation of the real variables following liquidity
growth shocks.
6. Simulate the liquidity flow equation starting from the steady state A∗ with liquidity
injection to all islands commensurate with the size of the smallest island. This as-
sumption ensures that all shocks are relatively small so that all approximations (e.g.
the log-linearization) makes sense. The shocks across island follow the same AR(1)
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process and are independent. The aggregate liquidity flow is given by A(t + 1) =
T (A(t) + Aexo(t)). Store the time-series of evolution of liquidity-holding for each
island.
7. Estimate an AR(1) process for liquidity evolution for each island. Even though the
exogenous shocks are i.i.d., due to the linkages (captured by the transition matrix T )
the estimated coefficients and the volatilities would be different. Given the sequence
of liquidity holding of an island {ai(t)}t=1,...,T , we can rewrite the flow equation for
i-th island as
ai(t + 1) = gi(t)ai(t). (1.28)
Thus we generate a sequence of growth rate of assets {gi(t)}t=1,...,T . By regressing
log gi(t) on log gi(t − 1), we get the estimate of the coefficient (p¯ii) and thus, we can
construct a proxy series of the growth rate shock as
log gi(t) = p¯ii log gi(t) + 
g
i . (1.29)
8. Feed it into a linearized system of equations describing the real variables of each
islands (Sec. 1.7.6.8) to generate time-series of real variables in each island. In
actual simulation, both the liquidity shock and an i.i.d. TFP shock is given to all
islands.
9. I treat the model as generating data at quarterly frequencies (the friction parameters
have been calibrated at the same; see Table. 1.4). Thus I aggregate sets of four
consecutive data points in the synthetic series to generate a new series at yearly
frequency. All statistics have been calculated using this series.
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1.7.6 Mathematical derivations
1.7.6.1 Consumers’ maximization problem
We set-up the Lagrangian as the following:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtE
(
αi log(CFi ) + (1 − αi) log(Ci) − B¯iLi (1.30)
+ λ1t(ai(t − 1) + PFi YFit + ∆aexoi (t) − PiCi −
N∑
j
PFj C
F
i j)
+ λ2t(wiLi(t) + riKi(t) + (1 − δ)Ki(t) + ξi(t) − Ki(t + 1) − ai(t)Pi(t) )
)
. (1.31)
We make a simplifying assumption that B¯i = (1 − αi)B. The choice variables are (for
the i-th country) CFi j(t), Ci(t), Li(t), Ki(t + 1) and ai(t).
αiβi j
CFi j(t)
= λ1tPFj (t)
1 − αi
Ci(t)
= λ1tPi(t),
B(1 − αi) = −λ2twi(t),
λ2t = βE
(
λ2(t+1)(ri(t + 1) + (1 − δ)))
λ2t
Pi(t)
= βE(λ1(t+1)). (1.32)
By combining the first order conditions, the following equations are derived.
1
wi(t)
= βE
( 1
wi(t + 1)
(ri(t + 1) + (1 − δ))
− B
wi(t)Pi(t)
= β(1 − αi)E( 1Pi(t + 1)Ci(t + 1)) (1.33)
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1.7.6.2 International market clearance
So far, we have solved the agent’s problem assuming that the international prices are ex-
ogenous. To solve for PFj (t), we consider all islands together. From the first order condi-
tions and the budget equation, we know that total expenditure on the j−th foreign good
PFj (t)C
F
i j(t) = αiβi j(P
F
i (t)Y
F
i (t) + ai(t − 1)), (1.34)
where the YFi (t) is a stochastic endowment for all islands i ≤ N. Thus, market-clearing
requires
YFj (t) =
N∑
i=1
CFi j(t)
=
N∑
i=1
αiβi j(PFi (t)Y
F
i (t) + ai(t − 1))
PFj (t)
(1.35)
1.7.6.3 Derivation of the asset flow equations
First, the solution of the model without exogenous liquidity shocks is shown. In the next
step, we add that shock. Let us denote the nominal value of tradables, PFj (t)Y j(t) by x j(t).
In vector notation, X(t) = {x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xN(t)}T and A(t − 1) = {a1(t − 1), a2(t −
1), . . . , aN(t − 1)}T with vT denoting the transpose of vector v. Therefore,
X(t) = QX(t) + QA(t − 1) (1.36)
where
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Q =

α1β11 α2β21 . . . αNβN1
α1β12 α2β22 . . . αNβN2
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
α1β1N α2β2N . . . αNβNN

.
Thus, the solution is
X(t) = (I − Q)−1QA(t − 1). (1.37)
Recall that the demand for asset is given as
ai(t) = (1 − αi)(ai(t − 1) + PFi (t)YFi (t)). (1.38)
By substituting the solution, we get
A(t) = D1−αA(t − 1) + D1−αX(t)
= D1−αAt−1 + D1−α(I − Q)−1QA(t − 1)
=
(
D1−α + D1−α(I − Q)−1Q)A(t − 1)
= TA(t − 1), (1.39)
where T = (D1−α + D1−α(I −Q)−1Q) is the transition matrix. We define D1−α as a diagonal
matrix with elements of the vector 1− α = {1− α1, 1− α2, . . . , 1− αN} along the diagonal.
By forwarding one-period, we get
A(t + 1) = TA(t). (1.40)
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If we include the exogenous liquidity shocks, the process can be rewritten as
A(t + 1) = T (A(t) + Aexo(t)). (1.41)
1.7.6.4 Producers’ problem in the i-th island
Following the structure assumed in the model, there is no linkage in the production pro-
cesses across islands. Thus all production decisions are taken separately. In the following,
all variables are specific to one island (generically indexed by i) and specific to the pro-
duction process of non-tradables (indexed by D). To simplify the exposition, I do not use
the superscript D and subscript i.
Final goods production Recall that the bundling technology is given by
Yt = [
∫ 1
0
Yt(k)
ψ−1
ψ dk]
ψ
ψ−1 (1.42)
with ψ > 1. A profit maximizing firm maximizes
pit = PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(k)Yt(k)dk, (1.43)
subject to the above bundling technology. Therefore, the problem is to maximize
Pt[
∫ 1
0
Yt(k)
ψ−1
ψ dk]
ψ
ψ−1 −
∫ 1
0
Pt(k)Yt(k)dk, (1.44)
and the first order condition is clearly,
Pt[
∫
Yt(k)
ψ−1
ψ dk]
1
ψ−1 Yt(k)−1/ψ = Pt(k). (1.45)
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This equation can be simplified to write down the demand function for good k as
Yt(k) = Yt
( Pt
Pt(k)
)ψ
. (1.46)
By plugging it back into the bundling technology, we get
Yt = Yt[
∫ 1
0
( Pt
Pt(k)
)ψ−1dk] ψψ−1 . (1.47)
This gives us the expression for the price index Pt:
Pt = [
∫ 1
0
Pt(k)1−ψdk]
1
1−ψ . (1.48)
Intermediate goods The intermediate goods firms resets price to maximize the market
value of the firm subject to the demand for their output by the final goods firms conditional
on the fact that there is a constant probability (1− ρ, following a Calvo rule) of getting the
chance to reset prices every period in future. The rest of the firms continue with the old
price. The production function is given by
Yt(k) = λtKθt L
1−θ
t (k), (1.49)
λt being a common technology shock to all firms. Markets for capital and labor are com-
petitive. Hence, their prices are taken to be constant by the firms. The problem of the firm
producing k−th variety is
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiρi[P∗t (k)Yt+i
( Pt+i
Pt ∗ (k)
)ψ − Pt+irt+iKt+i(k) − Pt+iwt+iLt+i(k)], (1.50)
58
subject to the production technology and the demand function,
Yt+i
( Pt+i
P∗t (k)
)ψ
= λtKθt L
1−θ
t (k). (1.51)
Solving the problem, we get the reset price as
P∗t (k) =
ψ
ψ − 1
Et
∑∞
i=0(βρ)
iPt+iYt+i(k) wt+i(1−θ)λt+i [
rt+i(1−θ)
wt+iθ
]
E + t
∑∞
i=0(βρ)iYt+i(k)
. (1.52)
Notice that all firms that are reseting the prices, will choose the same new price. Hence,
from the equation of the price index, we get
P1−ψt = ρP
1−ψ
t−1 + (1 − ρ)(P∗t )1−ψ. (1.53)
1.7.6.5 The aggregate model
Note that due to the unit elasticity of the tradabls and non-tradables in the utility function,
the demand functions are completely separable. Below we list the full system of equations
for the non-tradable sector(D) of the i−th economy:
1
β
= E[
wi(t)
wi(t + 1)
(ri(t + 1) + 1 − δ)]
B
wi(t)Pi(t)
= E
( αβ
Pi(t + 1)Ci(t + 1)
)
Pi(t)Ci(t) = gi(t)ai(t − 1)
Ki(t + 1) +
ai(t)
Pi(t)
= Yi(t) + (1 − δ)Ki(t)
P∗k(t) =
ψ
ψ − 1
Et
(∑∞
i=0(βρ)
iPt+iYt+i(k) wt+i(1−θ)λt+i [
rt+i(1−θ)
wt+iθ
]
)
Et
(∑∞
i=0(βρ)iYt+i(k)
)
(Pi)1−ψ = ρ (Pi)1−ψ (t − 1) + (1 − ρ)
(
PD∗i (t)
)1−ψ
ai(t) = gi(t)ai(t − 1) (1.54)
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Note that it is the third and the last equation (regarding money growth, gi(t)) is what
connects the domestic economy of the i−th island to the international market. Any trade
with foreign countries potentially induce a fluctuation in the growth rate gi(t) of assets
which in turn affects the domestic economy through the cash-in advance constraint.
1.7.6.6 Steady state
We describe the steady state of the i−th island by the following set of equations. For
simplifying exposition, we do not attach subscript i to all variables below.
1
β
= r¯ + 1 − δ,
βw¯ = −BC¯,
C¯ =
a¯
P¯
,
a¯
P¯
= w¯L¯ + ξ¯ + (r¯ − δ)K¯,
= Y¯ − δK¯,
P¯ = P¯(k),
Y¯(k) = Y¯ ,
w¯ = [
(ψ − 1)(1 − θ)1−θθθ
ψr¯θ
]
1
1−θ ,
L¯ = [
r¯(1 − θ)
w¯θ
]θY¯ ,
K¯ = [
r¯(1 − θ)
w¯θ
]θ−1Y¯ ,
Y¯ =
−Bw¯
B(w¯[ r¯(1−θ)w¯θ ]
θ + 1
ψ
+ (r¯ − δ)[ r¯(1−θ)w¯θ ]θ−1)
,
ξ¯ =
Y¯
ψ
.
(1.55)
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Any variable of the form x¯ denotes the steady state value of the variable x.
1.7.6.7 Log-linearized version
I log-linearize the system of equations described in Sec. 1.7.6.5 following Uhlig’s mothod.
The log-linearized version of the above system of equation is
0 = w˜t + βr¯Etr˜t+1 − Etw˜t+1,
0 = a˜t − a˜t−1 − g˜t,
0 = βEtP˜t+1 +
(1 − θ)(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ)
ρ
w˜t − (1 − ρ)(1 − βρ)
ρ
λ˜t
+
θ(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ)
ρ
r˜t − (1 + β)P˜t + P˜t−1,
0 = g˜t + a˜t−1 − P˜t − C˜t,
0 = Y¯Y˜t + (1 − δ)K¯K˜t − K¯K˜t+1 − a¯P¯ a˜t +
a¯
P¯
P˜t,
0 = w˜t + P˜t − a˜t − pig˜t,
0 = λ˜t + (1 − θ)L˜t + θK˜t − Y˜t,
0 = L˜t + w˜t − K˜t − r˜t. (1.56)
Any variable of the form x˜ denotes the log deviation from the steady state value of the
variable x i.e. x˜ = log x − log x¯.
1.7.6.8 Dynamics of the linearized system around the steady state
In solving this model, I explicitly follow the exposition of McCandless [2008]. A more
detailed description of the methods followed here will be available in the same reference
(see also Uhlig [1999]). Let χt = [K˜t+1, a˜t, P˜t]′, ωt = [r˜t, w˜t, C˜t, Y˜t, L˜t]′ and ηt = [λ˜t, g˜t]′.
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Then the system of eqn can be rewritten as
0 = M1χt + M2χt−1 + M3ωt + M4ηt,
0 = Et[M5χt+1 + M6χt + M7χt−1 + M8ωt+1 + M9ωt + M10ηt+1 + M11ηt],
ηt+1 = M12ηt + t, (1.57)
with suitable numerical values for the matrices M1,...,12. The solution of the above system
is given by
χt+1 = Aχt + Bηt,
ωt = Cχt + Dηt, (1.58)
where the matrices A, B,C,D are functions of matrices M1,...,12. More specifically, the
matrices A, B,C,D can be found in the follwoing way: A solves the matrix quadratic
equation:
(M5 − M8M−13 M1)A2 − (M8M−13 M2 − M6 + M9M−13 M1)A − M9M−13 M2 + M7 = 0. (1.59)
In the next step, we calculate
C = −M−13 (M1A + M2). (1.60)
Matrix B solves
vec(B) = (M′12 ⊗ (M5 − M8M−13 M1) + Ik ⊗ (M5A + M6 + M8C − M9M−13 M1))−1
×vec((M8M−13 M4)M12 + M9M−13 M4 − M11), (1.61)
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and finally,
D = M−13 (M1B + M4). (1.62)
1.7.7 Random network (E-R) vs. scale-free network
In a linear network, we can exactly pin down how the shock propagates from one island
to another since there is exactly one path through which the shock can spread. How-
ever, in a more general context that would not be possible because the number of paths
through which any two given islands can be connected, is possibly more than one. There-
fore, for any given graph with a particular degree distribution, we need some other metric
to understand the speed of propagation. The diameter of a graph is the maximal dis-
tance between any pair of nodes i.e. it is the longest shortest path. For a random graph
(Erdos-Renyi) with number of nodes N and average degree k > log(N), the diameter is
approximately log(N)/ log(k) (Jackson [2010]). Thus the expected diameter of a random
graph is O(log N). Similar property is shown by networks with small world properties (see
Dorogovtsev and Mendes [2003]). On the other hand, the diameter in a scale-free network,
having N nodes and degree distribution p(d) ∼ d−a, with the exponent 2 < a < 3 have a
much smaller diameter, is proportional to log log N (Cohen and Havlin [2003]). For a > 3,
the diameter behaves as O(log N). As is evident from the form of the degree distribution, a
scale-free network is characterized by existence of ‘hubs’ i.e. nodes which connects with a
huge number of other nodes and thus have a disproportionate representation in the degree
distribution. Because of these hubs, the average distance of the network decreases con-
siderably. For a complete review of different network structures, see Albert and Barabasi
[2002].
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1.7.8 Cover times for two regular networks
If we have a linear network (chain of islands),
c j = 4N2. (1.63)
On the other hand, for a complete network (with self-loops)
c j = N log N. (1.64)
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Chapter 2
Topology of international trade networks: disentangling the size,
asymmetry and volatility
2.1 Introduction
The degree of fluctuations of economic entities have been under study for long. High
volatility is often representative of risk for example in case of stock prices. Similarly, the
volatility of GDP of countries represent risk to the consumption decision of the economic
agents. Note that GDP is not only the production, but also the income of the country. The
topic of fluctuations in that aggregate income process has received a huge importance in
the standard economic literature. However, the source of the fluctuation in not particularly
well known. The candidate explanantions range from changing preferences to techno-
logical shocks to incorrect expectations. However, after the recent global melt-down that
originated in one country and then subsequently propagated to the rest of the world, it is
difficult to imagine that the volatility of the countries are purely intrinsic. In fact, given
the current degree of openness of the countries in terms of trade flow and capital flow, it
seems more realistic that the volatility of the countries are determined jointly, dependent
on each other simulataneously.
The international trade network (ITN hereafter) is a rapidly evolving economic entity
arising out of millions of small interactions between consumers and producers in differ-
ent countries (Chaney [2014]; Fagiolo et al. [2013]; Squirtini and Garlaschelli [2013];
Squartini et al. [2011a,b]). An interesting feature of the ITN is that it shows considerable
heterogeneity across its nodes. The countries vary widely in terms of the degree of strength
of their trade relationships with other countries thus making some countries substantially
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more influential in the network than others. During the course of economic globalization,
the countries have reduced barriers allowing free flow of goods and services across borders
which introduces two opposing forces on the partner countries. On one hand, the countries
have become more vulnerable to the shocks originated in other countries thus increasing
their own volatility (Easterly et al. [2000]). On the other hand, the countries can diversify
the risks better if they have more trading partners (Haddad et al. [2012]). The eventual
effect of trade openness is thus unclear. See the previous chapter for a fuller description of
the debate.
Here, we study the nexus between size-centrality-variance across countries. The re-
lationship between size and variance has been found and studied in the context of firm
dynamics (for example, see Riccaboni et al. [2008]; Stanley et al. [1996]; Amaral et al.
[1997a,b]). In case of dynamics of GDP, Canning et al. [1998] showed that size and
variance are inversely related. An interesting finding is that the scaling exponent seems
to be remarkably close in case of individual business entities and aggregate entities like
countries (Lee et al. [1998]). Gabaix [2011] proposed a framework to address the issue.
However, our focus is different from the above references in that we consider the network
as a whole and show that it is the asymmetry in the trade network that links volatility
and size of the countries. Taking this approach further Acemoglu et al. [2012] showed
the possibility of spill-over effects of micro-shocks across the whole economic network.
An alternate route (but related to Gabaix [2011]) was taken by Giovanni and Levchenko
[2012] that showed countries with skewed distribution of firm-sizes would show the size-
volatility trade-off. However, the effects of the network structure was ignored.
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2.2 Properties of the network and its relative stability
Consider a graph G = 〈N, A〉 where G is a couplet of the a set of nodes/countries N and
the adjacency matrix A that captures the information of the node-to-node connections.
In the present case, Ai j ( j , i∀i, j) is the relative weight of import of country i from j.
The diagonal entries are the size of the domestic economies. Hence, the trade network
is both directed and weighted (Fig. 1.1). A noteworthy point is that in real data G is
found to be almost always fully connected in the sense that each economy is connected to
every other economy by imports and exports. Thus the only reasonable choice of studying
relative influence would be eigenvector centrality C which is defined as the solution to the
equation
Ax = x. (2.1)
Note that by construction of the adjacency matrix A, it is column-stochastic (see Appendix)
with all elements positive. Thus by Perron-Frobenius theorem we know that the maximum
eigenvalue would be 1. The corresponding eigenvector is taken to be the centrality index
Jackson [2010]. This index is self-referential in the sense that if a node is connected
to another node with high prestige, then the original node’s prestige increases. In the
current context, the interpretation is if a country has stronger trade relationship with a
country which has a well diversified portfolio (and hence lower volatility) then the original
country’s volatility also decreases because of the connections. This feature is captured in
Fig. 2.1. To measure volatility of an economy i, the logged per-capita GDP time series
{log(Yit)} is first decomposed into a trend and a cyclical component with an HP filter,
Yit = T Yit + C
Y
it . (2.2)
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Figure 2.1: Scatter plots of eigenvector centralities of countries in the international trade
network and their corresponding degree of fluctuations. To measure the fluctuations we
use the standard deviations of detrended (with HP-filter) log per capita GDP. See text for
details. The four panels show that the relationship is fairly stable over time. The linear
relationship indicates the coefficient is around 0.20.
The second component gives the business cycle fluctuations. The standard deviation of the
cyclical component CYit is taken to be the appropriate measure of macroeconomic volatility.
Fig. 2.1 shows the scatter plots of centrality and volatility of multiple years. The negative
relationship is evident in all cases. It is important to note that a similar finding has been
made in Gray and Potter [2012] albeit with a different interpretation of fluctuations. It
considered the volatility of growth rate of GDP in line of Canning et al. [1998] without
any particular attention of the cyclical component. Here, I consider detrended series only;
hence the results are free of the intrinsic trends in growth which are caused by long run
factors like physical and human capital accumulation.
2.2.1 Centrality and volatility of macro variables
Interestingly there are multiple papers claiming a similar scaling relationship between size
and volatility of economic entities (Riccaboni et al. [2008]). Gabaix [2011] has presented
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a theoretical argument for deriving such a scaling coefficient.
In Table 2.1, the variables are trade openness (i.e. (Export+Import)/GDP), domestic
credit to GDP ratio (Credit/GDP), total value of stocks traded as a ratio of GDP, log volatil-
ity of FDI as a ratio of GDP and log of eigenvector centrality. The volatilities have been
computed by detrending the respective series (logged) by an HP-filter starting from 1999-
2012. Other variables are computed at their 2010 values. Size or GDP being extremely
correlated with centrality, does not have substantial explanatory power. We instrument the
variable ‘centrality’ which reflects centrality in the trade network, by geographic centrality
(see Table 2.4).
The way I construct the geographic centrality is as follows. From Mayer and Zignago
[2011], I get data on bilateral distance capitals of the countries. From that one can con-
struct an N × N matrix of distance and solve for the dominant eigenvector. Note that this
exercise gives the eigenvector centrality of the distance matrix. But one more modification
is needed to construct the index of geographic centrality. The country which has the high-
est score is the most distant from all other countries and conversely, the country with the
least score is the least distant from all other countries. Therefore, I define the geographic
centrality to be the inverse of the centrality vector of the distance matrix.
The results are shown in Table 2.3. Another important variable that is negatively re-
lated to macro volatility is credit to GDP ratio. Easterly et al. [2000] also makes a similar
observation. The first stage F-stat is greater than 10.
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Table 2.1: N = 27. Regression results showing log of volatilities of macro-variables being negatively related to log of centrality.
p-values less than 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The
last row shows the p-value of the F-test.
Variables σY σC σI σY σC σI σY σC σI
constant -4.0244∗∗∗ -4.6420∗∗∗ -3.1299∗∗∗ 2.1005 5.5706 4.2603 -3.9168∗∗∗ -4.4038∗∗∗ -3.1112∗∗∗
(0.3978) (0.7236) (0.3472) (5.9064) (10.7903) (5.0260) (0.4811) (0.8733) (0.4216)
trade op. 0.1208 0.0274 0.1299 -0.0574 -0.2699 -0.0582 0.0971 -0.0251 0.1258
(0.1602) (0.2915) (0.1398) (0.2345) (0.4284) (0.1966) (1731) (0.3142) (0.1517)
credit/GDP -0.3557∗∗ -0.3146 -0.3434∗∗ -0.2473 -0.1339 -0.2127 -0.3477∗∗ -0.2970 -0.3421∗∗
(0.1605) (0.2919) (0.1400) (0.1911) (0.3491) (0.1626) (1648) (0.2992) (0.1444)
stocks/GDP 0.2741 0.1662 0.3268 0.3175 0.2346 0.3792 0.3040 0.2283 0.3320
(0.3605) (0.6558) (0.3146) (0.3622) (0.6617) (0.3082) (0.3747) (0.6802) (0.3284)
FDIvol 0.1624 -0.0637 -0.0662 0.1599 -0.0680 -0.0692 0.1634 -0.0615 -0.0660
(0.1955) (0.3556) (0.1706) (0.1951) (0.3565) (0.1660) (0.1995) (0.3621) (0.1748)
centrality1 -0.1774∗∗∗ -0.2620∗∗ -0.2333∗∗∗ -0.0130 0.0121 -0.0349 -0.1628∗∗ -0.2298∗ -0.2307∗∗∗
(0.0629) (0.1144) (0.0549) (0.1702) (0.3109) (0.1448) (0.0731) (0.1327) (0.0641)
size -0.2071 -0.3453 -0.2499
(0.1993) (0.3640) (0.1696)
rel. size -0.9316 -2.0621 -0.1616
(2.2361) (4.0591) (1.9596)
R2 0.4273 0.3015 0.5850 0.4567 0.3316 0.6257 0.4322 0.3104 0.5852
F-test 0.0288 0.1539 0.0014 0.0382 0.1845 0.0016 0.0543 0.2287 0.0039
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Table 2.2: N = 27. Regression results showing log of volatilities of macro-variables being negatively related to log of centrality.
p-values less than 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The
last row shows the p-value of the F-test.
Variables σY σC σI σY σC σi σY σC σI
constant -3.9372∗∗∗ -4.5026∗∗∗ -3.0464∗∗∗ 11.2053 21.2926 11.9620∗ -3.8223∗∗∗ -4.2397∗∗∗ -3.0495∗∗∗
(0.4018) (0.7256) (0.3537) (7.8252) (14.2786) (6.7139) (0.4967) (0.8948) (0.4391)
trade op. 0.0502 0.0765 0.0354 -0.2195 -0.5360 -0.2319 0.0321 -0.1180 0.0359
(0.1647) (0.2975) (0.1450) (0.2083) (0.3800) (0.1787) (1738) (0.3131) (0.1537)
credit/GDP -0.3146∗ -0.2513 -0.2974∗∗ -0.0934 0.1256 -0.0782 -0.3073 -0.2344 -0.2976
(0.1609) (0.2905) (0.1416) (0.1895) (0.3458) (0.1626) (1651) (0.2975) (0.1460)
stock/GDP 0.2429 0.1056 0.3166 0.2393 0.0996 0.3131 0.2666 0.1599 0.3159
(0.3765) (0.6799) (0.3314) (0.3540) (0.6459) (0.3037) (0.3885) (0.6998) (0.3434)
FDIvol 0.1692 -0.0543 -0.0556 0.1375 -0.1082 -0.0870 0.1692 -0.0544 -0.0556
(0.2013) (0.3635) (0.1772) (0.1900) (0.3466) (0.1630) (0.2054) (0.3700) (0.1816)
centrality2 -0.1615∗∗ -0.2359∗ -0.2203∗∗∗ 0.2556 0.4746 0.1931 -0.1451 -0.1983 -0.2207
(0.0640) (0.1156) (0.0564) (0.2236) (0.4079) (0.1918) (0.0766) (0.1381) (0.0678)
size -0.5125∗∗ -0.8731∗∗ -0.5080∗∗
(0.2646) (0.4827) (0.2270)
rel. size -0.9709 -2.2212 0.0266
(2.3692) (4.2680) (2.0944)
R2 0.3941 0.2715 0.5532 0.4898 0.3739 0.6427 0.3992 0.2812 0.5532
F-test 0.0471 0.2132 0.0029 0.0228 0.1151 0.0010 0.0843 0.3005 0.0074
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Table 2.3: N = 27. Regression results showing log of volatilities of macro-variables being
negatively related to log of centrality. The trade-network centrality has been instrumented
by geographic centrality (centrality vector obtained from constructing a network based on
actual country-to-country distance along the geodesics).
Variables σY σC σI
constant -4.3141*** -4.5960*** -3.1551***
(0.4568) (0.8089) (0.4545)
trade openness 0.1380 0.0943 0.0821
(0.1461) (0.2588) (0.1454)
credit/GDP -0.4063** -0.5150 -0.3009**
(0.1662) (0.2943) (0.1653)
stocks traded/GDP 0.4899 0.8568 0.4260
(0.4184) (0.7409) (0.4163)
FDIvol 0.1431 -0.4681 -0.1993
(0.1789) (0.3169) (0.1780)
centrality -0.2391*** -0.3480** -0.2670***
(0.0909) (0.1610) (0.0904)
R2 0.4008 0.3211 0.4479
Wald χ2-test (p > χ2) 0.0072 0.0546 0.0021
2.2.2 The relationship at quarterly frequency
For robustness, I have checked the relationship between volatility and centrality with data
obtained at quarterly frequency. However, the problem with this data set is that it is not
seasonally adjusted. Thus the main analysis is done with annual data. The other drawback
is that the source only provides data evaluated at current prices. Thus I have normalized
each data point (nominal GDP or consumption or capital formation) by the relevant price
Table 2.4: Correlation table showing that geographic centrality Cgeo is fairly correlated to
trade centrality Ctrade, but much less correlated to the size Y .
Variables Corr. coefficient
Ctrade and Y 0.87
Ctrade and Cgeo 0.52
Y and Cgeo 0.19
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index relative to the year 2005. Even though it suffers from such ad-hoc adjustment pro-
cesses, we see that the negative relationship prevails .
2.3 Model perturbation
In the following, we generalize the above results to include more elaborate network struc-
tures. Note that the transition matrix T is also the adjacency matrix of the corresponding
network showing how the islands are connected to each other. Each element Ti j gives the
weight of the link between islands i and j. Therefore, to discuss both the trade pattern and
the dynamics of the system, we can use the properties of the transition matrix T .
So far we assumed all pairs of islands trade with each other, which effectively means
that all islands attach positive weights in the utility functions to all goods produced in
other islands. First , we relax that assumption allowing the possibility that some island
may actually not trade with some other island i.e. some islands may attach zero weight
(limiting) to production of some islands, which makes the transition matrix semi-positive.
Before stating the results, we need to define a few terms. A walk in a network G ≡ (N,T )
refers to a sequence of nodes, n1, n2, n3, . . . , nK such that nknk+1 ∈ T for each k ≤ K and
the length of the walk is the number of links in it, or K − 1. A path in a network (N,T ) is
a walk such that all the nodes are distinct.
Definition 3. A network G ≡ (N,T ) is path-connected if there is a path in (N,T ) between
every pair of nodes i and j.
The degree of a node i in a network (N,T ) is the number of neighbors that i has in the
network, so that di(T ) = |Ni(T )|. In the present context, the degree of an island refers to the
number of islands that it trades with such that the weight attached in the utility function is
strictly positive (hence the edges also have strictly positive weights).
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The following proposition establishes a convergence result for trade networks with
possibility of zero weights.
Proposition 7. If the trade network is path-connected and the associated transition matrix
is aperiodic, there exists an stationary distribution of assets.
To prove the above proposition, we use the following basic convergence theorem of
Markov chains.
Proposition 8. Let T be the transition matrix of a Markov chain that is aperiodic and
irreducible. Then there exists a stationary probability distribution over the states.
Along with it, note that irreducibility of the chain is equivalent to the underlying net-
work being path-connected. Proposition 7 sets a limit on sparseness of the transition (or
trade) matrix. It shows that as long as the assumption of path-connectedness is retained
i.e. given any two islands there exists a path connecting them however long that might be,
we can appeal to the same set of results to study the dynamics.
Example 5. Panels (ii) and (iii) of Fig. 1.4 are examples of path-connected network.
Example 6. Consider an economy with two islands with the transition matrix,
T =
0 11 0
 .
Thus if the islands start with liquidity-holding a1 and a2, both of them will have a se-
quence of alternating levels of liquidity-holding viz a1, a2, a1 . . .. Therefore, to ensure
convergence, we need aperiodicity. Note that without this condition, the liquidity shocks
(a1/a2 or a2/a1) will be periodic and hence, so will be the corresponding fluctuations in
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the real variables. Such fluctuations are evidently endgenous, but since they are periodic,
it is not a particularly realistic scenario.
Since path-connectedness of the trade network appears to a necessary condition for
convergence of the system, here we provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for
having a path-connected network with exogenously imposed degree sequences. Let us
denote the degree (connectivity) of the i-th island by di. Thus the degree sequence of all
islands is given by d1, d2, . . . , dN . There are two conditions;
For realizability: for 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1,
k∑
i=1
di ≤ k(k − 1) +
N∑
i=k+1
min{k, di}, (2.3)
and for connectedness:
N∑
i=1
di ≥ 2(N − 1). (2.4)
Erdos-Gallai theorem (Choudum [1986]) states that these two are necessary as well as
sufficient conditions to generate a connected network satisfying a given degree sequence.
Next, we consider stochastic preferences which means the parameters of the utility
functions describing the relative weights to consumption of different goods (tradables
and non-tradables) can vary over time. Thus the transition matrix now becomes time-
nonnhomogenous Tt.
Assume that Tt are stochastic matrices for all t and are independently and identically
distributed. Then we can apply following proposition for ergodicity of time-nonhomogeneous
Markov chain.
Proposition 9. (following Thm 1.4, Bruneau et al. [2010]): If the elements of the time-
nonhomogeneuos transition matrix Tt are strictly positive with positive probability, then
the Markov chain converges in exponential time.
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See Bruneau et al. [2010] for a detailed proof and discussions.
2.4 Appendix
2.4.1 Abstract
The international trade network is a complex outcome of numerous purchasing decisions
made at the micro level, containing aggregate information about the production technolo-
gies and consumers’ preferences across countries connected through trade. Thus it acts as
a vehicle of spill-over of domestic productivity/preference shocks to the trading partners.
The degree is asymmetry in the empirical network indicates different network-wide repur-
cussoins of idiosyncratic shocks to individual economies. The structure of the network is
shown to be intimately related to the size of the countries and macroeconomic volatility.
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Chapter 3
Economic incentives versus institutional frictions: dynamics of
cross-country migration (with Aparna Dutta)
And the Lord said, “Indeed the people are one and they all have one language,
and this is what they begin to do; now nothing that they propose to do will be
withheld from them.
Come, let Us go down and there confuse their language, that they may not
understand one anothers speech.”
So the Lord scattered them abroad from there over the face of all the earth . . .
-Genesis 11:49 (Tower of Babel)
3.1 Introduction
The basic question we ask in this chapter is why do people migrate and how socio-cultural
barriers cause an impediment in the process? Migration is a fairly old phenomena. Across
the world, people move from place to place in search for better economic and social lives.
Especially in the current age of globalization, the world has seen an ever-increasing stock
of people who live far away from their native countries. The rapid improvement of the
communication and transportation technology along with the removal of legal and polit-
ical barriers contributed to this increased flow of people between countries. However, in
multiple instances this process of labor relocation does not work quite smoothly. To put
some numbers to understand the magnitude of the problem, consider the U.S. where the
average flow of migrants across states was about 2% in the last 20 years1. However, in
1This rate actually shows a secular decline over the same period as in 1990 the rate was about 3% and in
2011, the rate is about 1.5% of the whole population (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl [2013]).
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case of Europe this rate is in the order of 1/100-th of the corresponding value for the U.S.
This phenomenon is referred to in the literature as the ‘European immobility puzzle’ (see
for example, Braunerhjelm et al. [2000]). An important policy question is what explains
this missing mass of migrants? The answer, as we will show later, lies in the differences
of languages more than other factors.
There are multiple reasons why people choose to migrate. Probably the most important
motivation to migrate arises from purely economic factors e.g. higher wage or productivity
in one country vis-a-vis another (Kennan and Walker [2011], Bertoli et al. [2013]). Insti-
tutional factors also play an important role in shaping the same decision-making process.
For example, differences in languages, cultures or customs may present an impediment in
the process (Belot and Ederveen [2012]). Thus from a purely economic point of view, the
phenomenon of migration between countries with similar economic characteristics can be
thought of as an adjustment process or a reallocation process of labor resulting from asym-
metric productivity shocks. However, various socio-cultural (or political for that matter)
factors can induce frictions on this process reducing the extent of the reallocation process.
Ultimately, how the actual dynamics shapes up is a complex interplay between such eco-
nomic and sociological forces. Understanding of the mechanism underlying migration is
of first-order importance as low levels of migration due to structural or institutional rigidi-
ties imply less flexible labor market. Thus the economy if hit by negative spatial and/or
sectoral shocks, will take more time to adjust, prolonging the downturn. Batini et al.
[2010] for example argues that low inter-state migration was a potential cause of the slow
recovery of the U.S. economy after the 2007-08 crisis. What makes it more compelling
is that U.S. is found to be much more flexible in terms of migration than Europe. Thus
a similar downturn would be way more prolonged in Europe with a far more rigid labor
market, which the European Union largely wanted to avoid by allowing free movement of
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labor. Therefore a decomposition of the effects of sheer economic force and institutional
factors is important to understand their relative effects on labor allocation.
Our primary target in this chapter is to explain the relative contributions of different
economic and institutional factors in determining the magnitude of migration across coun-
tries. These effects are most prominently seen in case of Europe vis-a-vis U.S. These two
political unions being ‘North’ have far less variation in economic conditions among the
constituent states than a ‘North-South’ relationship like U.S. and India. Thus one might
imagine such an union to comprise smaller states sharing largely similar economic back-
ground (identical labor laws, integrated financial markets etc.), connected to each other by
economic linkages though trade and migration. If the constituent states receive asymmet-
ric productivity shocks, we would expect workers to flow from the low-productivity state
to high productivity state, in a friction-less world. Thus the process of migration would
manifest itself in two forms; first, there would be people migrating to-and-fro between all
pairs of states which gives us an idea about relative flow of workers between pairs of states
and second, the total mass of migrants i.e. the total mass of workers that were displaced
due to the realization of the productivity shocks. In short, we can refer to them as the
extensive and intensive margin of migration respectively. We construct a model consistent
with the U.S. data in terms of the labor network generated as well as the total mass of
migrants. Then we show that the model captures the labor network across Europe well but
over-predicts the total mass of migrants. The difference between the model and the data
is explained by an array of various institutional factors, lingual differences being the the
most persistent one.
In the following, we first present an N-country, two-sector model augmented with
sector and country specific idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The basic inputs are capital
and labor which we assume to be fixed and movable in the short-run, respectively. Labor
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being the only movable input, in face of different cross-sectional realization of shocks, it
would move across states according to the relative attractiveness based on productivity.
Thus from one set of labor allocation, we reach another set such that utilities are equalized
across the states restoring equilibrium. The underlying logic is that migratory responses
are ultimately utility enhancing2 (Ashby [2007]). Therefore any friction not allowing free-
movement of labor would reduce welfare. The model allows us to explicitly pin down the
effects on labor allocation. Assuming homogeneity of labor, we can construct a labor flow
network by combining all pairs of countries. Thus when the countries experience series
of productivity shocks, we generate a labor flow network resulting from the model as an
equilibrium response to external perturbation. The driving mechanisms behind migration
are two-folds. The first one is a pure general equilibrium channel which captures the labor
flow as an outcome of sectoral reallocation process due to productivity differences across
sectors. The second one is the trade channel through which we quantify the inter-country
labor flow due to spill-over of productivity shocks due to the trade process. In general,
the essential mechanism can be thought of as a planner’s problem where the planner treats
(perfectly divisible) labor as a movable productive input and allocates it across countries
according to productivity shocks realized in different countries.
Broadly, we borrow from the recently blooming literature in international trade theory
(in the tradition of the celebrated Eaton and Kortum [2002] model) that combines a rich
description of the production processes thus capturing the propagation of shocks across
the network along with adjustable i.e. movable productive inputs. We show that a simi-
larly specified model can serve as a benchmark case for a frictionless world. With repeated
2Tiebout [1956] makes an interesting observation that with low rigidities in labor market and no asym-
metries in information or externalities induced by government, the consumers would reveal their preference
through migration. This idea of ‘voting with feet’ is found to have significant empirical support Banzhaf
and Walsh [2008]. However, in the current paper we do not differentiate between the consumption bundles.
Only factor productivity drives migration.
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shocks (calibrated to data) the model generates an weighted and directed network3 of labor
flow in the steady state that provides a micro-founded theory of multilateral gravity equa-
tion of migration. However, there are various social-cultural-political-geographical factors
working for and against this process which alters the allocation and hence induces a sub-
optimal outcome. Thus such frictions are associated with an welfare loss. We augment
the labor flow equations derived from the basic model with several types of frictions to
analyze their relative deterrence effects. The contiguity of the countries is seen to induce
a bigger flow in data compared to the model. On the other hand, distances in terms of
language and culture seems to deter migration. This finding captures the basic proposition
of Belot and Ederveen [2012]. With an enlarged database we also find other institutional
factors like financial and legal conditions affects migration.
This paper is related to several streams of literature. On the theoretical dimension, the
paper adopts the view that a joint description of the global economy (in the very specific
context of current problem i.e. Europe or the U.S.) is important to understand the mech-
anism underlying migration as evidently the mass of migrants between two countries is
influenced by the other countries that are potential donors or receivers (as documented for
example in Bertoli and Moraga [2013]). Thus the most general description of the process
would be in terms of a flow network which is both weighted and directed signifying the
differential mass of migrants migrating between different pairs of countries as well as cap-
turing the direction of movement. Joint evolution of sectors and propagation of shocks in
a interconnected economy and subsequent adjustments has been studied extensively in the
recent years (see for example, Acemoglu et al. [2012], Oberfield [2013], Foerster et al.
[2011]).
3A network is defined as a collection of edges and nodes. In our case, the countries/states are the modes
and the country-to-country labor flows constitute the edges. Since the mass of labor flowing between dif-
ferent pairs of countries are different, we call the network weighted and since the inflow is not necessarily
equal to outflow in terms of labor, we call the network directed.
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In particular, our model depends heavily on the structure laid down by Caliendo et al.
[2014] which shows that interregional trade propagates the disaggregated shocks to the
rest of the economy. We borrow this idea of sector and region-specific TFP shocks and
argue that the complex structure of regional composition of industries and asymmetric
TFP shocks in these industries lead to migration. We create a network of regional and
sectoral linkages which transmits the idiosyncratic shocks throughout the economy. The
framework is in turn, based on the international trade literature in the tradition of the
Eaton and Kortum [2002] and its subsequent modifications by Alvarez and Lucas [2007].
We analyze the model in the steady state to pin down the labor flow network. Thus even
though we borrow the methodology of trade theory and we explicitly calibrate the model
to match the trade characteristics of the data, for our purpose it only works as a medium
of propagation of shocks. More importantly, we recognize the role of various frictions in
determining the actual level of migration. Albeit different in scope, Redding et al. [2012]
provides a theory of structural change which can be interpreted as bilateral migration,
based on a similar trade theoretic structure. An expanded framework was used by Redding
[2014] to study the welfare gains from trade. As such the present contribution is an attempt
to bridge the trade theoretic literature to the labor migration literature (Goston and Nelson
[2013]).
There is a huge empirical literature on migration and various factors that magnifies or
lessens it. Treyz et al. [1993] was as early attempt that considered a behavioral model of
migration and using time-series data showed that migration is affected, among others, by
relative employment opportunities, relative wages, industry composition and local ameni-
ties. In our theoretical model, the first three effects have been explicitly taken care of and
we consider a data set richer in scope to pin down more disaggregated effects of various
institutional factors. Klein and Ventura [2009] constructs a growth model to study the
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welfare gains from removing barriers to migration as there exists substantial productivity
differences between the countries (see also Klein and Ventura [2007] for the theoretical
analysis of the dynamic model). However, they focus on the historical evolution of the
migration pattern and study aggregated data. The effects of various types of frictions have
been studied in details. For example, Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl [2013] studies the rea-
son behind the secular decline in U.S. interstate migration over the last two decades and
finds reduced geographic specificity and higher information about the states to be impor-
tant factors. Even then, U.S. interstate migration is far more prominent than Intra-Europe
migration. Empirically, Palmer and Pytlikova [2013] finds lax labor laws to be an attrac-
tive factor positively affecting intra-Europe migration whereas Belot and Ederveen [2012]
finds cultural differences to present an obstacle in the same context. See Molloy et al.
[2011] and Coen-Pirani [2010] for a detailed overview of the interstate migration in U.S.
Finally, Wang [2014] studied preferences of migrant workers for multi-national corpora-
tions over other firms in the OECD countries. In the current formulation, we do not address
the preferences of worker over types of firms as that lies outside the scope of the present
work.
3.2 A model of migration
In this section, our goal is to provide a model to capture annual bilateral migration be-
tween different pairs of countries. We consider a model with T (finite) periods where
each year N islands (N countries belonging to the European Union or N states of U.S.)
experiences idiosyncratic shocks exactly T times and thee workers can move across the
islands depending on the relative intensities of the shocks. In the following, we will refer
to both countries and states as ‘islands’ to avoid confusion, unless explicitly mentioned.
Each island is populated by a continuum of homogeneous households. There are trad-
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ables and non-tradable final goods produced by firms in each island for the consumption
of the households. For fixing the notion, we assume manufacturing industry constitutes the
tradables and the service industry produces the non-tradables. Each of the final goods pro-
ducing industries also produces a continuum of intermediate goods using local labor and a
local fixed capital stock. This stock might be interpreted as the structures and land which
does not grow over time or at least, grows at a much slower pace than labor movement.
The islands trade on intermediate inputs. The final goods are only for consumption. The
household supplies its labor to both sectors in the home country.Since the islands have
their idiosyncratic productivity shocks process and labor is the only mobile factor, sec-
tor and island-specific productivity shocks will lead to multi-lateral flow of labor across
sectors and islands. This feature is obtained from the model proposed by Caliendo et al.
[2014]. The flow of workers from one island to another is interpreted as migration.
3.2.1 Households’ problem
In each island a continuum of households constitutes the demand side. They are the sole
suppliers of labor which is used in the local production processes. There are two final
goods, tradables (M) and non-tradables(S ). As has been described above, we lump manu-
facturing industries to constitutes the tradable sector and the service producing industries
to constitute the non-tradable sector. The instantaneous utility function of households in
the n-th island at a generic time-point t is defined over consumption of the manufactured
goods (CM) and service (CS ),
Unt = (CMnt )
α(CSnt)
(1−α), (3.1)
where α is the relative weight attached to manufactured goods. The budget constraint
simply states that the total expenditure of the manufactured goods and services has to be
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less than equal to income. This can be written as
PMnt C
M
nt + P
S
ntC
S
nt ≤ Int, (3.2)
where the term on the right hand side denotes per-capita income which is the sum of rental
income earned from fixed capital stock (or structures and land as has been described in
Caliendo et al. [2014]) and wage. Lets us denote the interest rate by r, the island-specific
fixed capital stock by K, labor by L and wage rate by w. Thus we have the income equation,
Int = rnt
Knt
Lnt
+ wnt. (3.3)
The expected lifetime utility of an agent who over time migrates to a sequence of islands
{n}1,...,T , is
UT = E
 T∑
t=1
Unt
 where Unt is given by Eqn. 3.1. (3.4)
In order to solve the model, we will assume that there is no uncertainty in the economy in
the sense that at every period, the agents first see the realized values of the factor productiv-
ity and then decide where to move. However, given diminishing productivity of labor, the
utility is equalized across all islands to restore equilibrium ensuring an interior solution.
This allows us to solve each period separately as there is no dynamic trade-off. Therefore,
we will drop the time index in the later calculations with the implicit understanding that
the solution holds true for every period. Clearly the consumption choice is given by
CMnt = α
Int
PMnt
and CSnt = (1 − α)
Int
PSnt
. (3.5)
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By substituting the demand functions in the utility function, we can find out the indirect
utility function of households in one island as
Unt =
( α
PMnt
)α(1 − α
PSnt
)1−αInt,
=
Int
Pnt
, (3.6)
where Pnt is the standard ideal price index defined over the prices of sectoral goods as
Pnt =
(PMnt
α
)α( PSnt
1 − α
)1−α
. (3.7)
Since the agents are free to move across the islands, in equilibrium we would have utility
equalized across the islands and hence,
Unt = U¯t. (3.8)
Note that utility has to be equalizes across islands at every point of time, but not necessarily
across time. In other words, in general U¯t , U¯t′ for any t, t′ ≤ T . Thus the lifetime utility
of an agent is
UT =
T∑
t=1
U¯t (3.9)
whatever be the sequence of islands she migrated to in her lifetime.
3.2.2 Supply side
The final goods (both manufactured goods and the service products) are used for con-
sumption. However, in each sector these goods (M and S ) are produced by a bundling
technology which uses a continuum of intermediate goods. These intermediates are in
turn produced by combining local labor and capital stock. Note that as in Caliendo et al.
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[2014], we keep the trade channel open as the final goods producing firms can buy inter-
mediate goods from any island. Thus we can identify the source of fluctuation in labor
allocation through this channel.
3.2.2.1 Intermediates
Firms of both sectors j ∈ {M, S } in each island n, produces a continuum of varieties of
intermediate goods following an i.i.d. shock process, ξ jn and a deterministic productivity
level Z jn. As in Caliendo et al. [2014], the shock process ξ
j
n follows a Frechet distribution
with shape parameter θ j. The production functions for both sectors ( j ∈ {M, S }) are defined
as
q jn = ξ
j
nZ
j
n(k
j
n)
β(l jn)
1−β, (3.10)
where lowercase letters l and k denote the demand for labor and capital respectively by a
representative firm, β being the relative weight assigned to capital. The shock process Z jn
is assumed to follow a random walk in logarithm that is, we assume that
Z jn(t + 1) = ψitZ
j
n(t) where ψi ∼ N(1, σi) and i ∈ {M, S }. (3.11)
The unit cost of production in each sector in island n can be found by minimizing
w jnl
j
n + r
j
nk
j
n, (3.12)
subject to
ξ jnZ
j
n(k
j
n)
β(l jn)
1−β = 1. (3.13)
Thus we can derive the unit cost as a function of the productivity levels and the input
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prices- wage and rental rate,
c jn =
1
ξ
j
nZ
j
n
[β−β(1 − β)(1−β)]rβnw(1−β)n . (3.14)
Thus the firms would produce the variety as long as the price more than the unit cost
c jn. Assuming perfect competition, price is exactly equal to the unit cost. For notational
convenience, we lump the terms in the unit cost function and denote them by
B = β−β(1 − β)(1−β) and ω jn = Brβnw(1−β)n . (3.15)
Let p jn denote the equilibrium price of two sectors ( j ∈ {M, S }) in the n-th island. Thus
profit pi of a firm producing intermediate goods in the j-th sector is simply given by total
revenue minus wage bill and rental payment,
pi
j
intermediates = p
j
nq
j
n − wnl jn − rnk jn. (3.16)
Thus at the optimal level the expenditures on labor and capital are (see Eqn. 3.10)
wnl jn = (1 − β)p jnq jn, (3.17)
rnk jn = βp
j
nq
j
n. (3.18)
3.2.2.2 Final goods
As has been described above, the final goods production in both sectors ( j ∈ {M, S }) is
carried out competitively using a bundling technology,
Q jn = [
∫
(q˜ jn(ξ
j))γ
j
nφ j(ξ j)dξ j]1/γ
j
n , (3.19)
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where the i.i.d. productivity shocks on intermediate goods are distributed as
φM(ξM) = exp
( − N∑
n=1
(ξMn )
−θM ), (3.20)
φS (ξS ) = exp
( − (ξSn )−θS ), (3.21)
and q˜ is the optimally chosen level of production of the intermediate goods. Since inter-
mediates for manufactured goods are traded, the shocks are jointly distributed whereas
for non-tradable service sector, that is not the case. Thus the pattern of trade between the
islands is incorporated in the above production functions in terms of intermediates.
Therefore in the n-th island, the profit of the final goods producers in both sectors
( j ∈ M, S ) are defined as total revenue from selling the final goods minus the cost of
procuring and using the intermediates,
pi
j
n, f inal = P
j
nQ
j
n −
∫
p jn(ξ
j)q˜ jn(ξ
j)φ jn(ξ
j)dξ j, (3.22)
where the final goods production function is given above (Eqn. 3.2.2.2). Clearly the
optimal demand for a particular type of intermediate good is given by
q˜ jn =
( p jn(ξ j)
P jn
)− 1
1−γ jn Q jn, (3.23)
which on substitution in the production function gives us the aggregate price level for the
final good as a function of prices of intermediates used in the production process,
P jn = [
∫ (
p jn(ξ
j)
) γ jn
γ
j
n−1 φ j(ξ j)dξ j]
γ
j
n−1
γ
j
n . (3.24)
Intuitively, this functional form of the aggregate pricing equation reflects the particular
bundling technology assumed in Eqn. .
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3.2.2.3 Closing the model
Final goods are non-tradable in all sectors. Only the intermediates in the manufacturing
sector M are tradables. The cost of transportation from location n to i (in units of good
produced in location n) is given as
τMni ≥ 1,
τSni = ∞. (3.25)
For obvious reasons, we define τMnn = 1. Such a structure imposes a ice-berg cost on
transportation. Therefore, due to cost minimization the pricing equations for intermediates
are given as
pMn = mini
(κMinωMi
ξMi Z
M
i
)
. (3.26)
Following Eaton and Kortum [2002], such a specification gives us
PMn = Γ( f
M
n )
γMn /(γ
M
n −1)[
N∑
i=1
[ωMi κ
M
in ]
−θM (ZMi )
θM ]−1/θ
M
, (3.27)
where Γ(.) denotes a gamma function and f Mn = 1 + (γ
M
n )/(θ
M(γMn − 1)) where γMn is the
measure of substitutability of intermediates in the production function of the final goods
(see Eqn. 3.2.2.2). On the other hand, the price index of the non-tradables is given as
PSn = Γ( f
S
n )
γMn /(γ
M
n −1)ωSn (Z
S
n )
−1, (3.28)
where f Sn is defined analogously in terms of the measure of substitutability (γ
S
n ) in the
production of the service good. The labor market clearing holds at two levels. Within each
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island, total labor must be equal to the sum of the sectoral allocation,
LMn + L
S
n = Ln ∀n ≤ N (3.29)
and at the aggregate level, total labor endowment must be equal to the sum of the geo-
graphical distribution across islands,
∑
n
Ln = 1. (3.30)
Similarly for capital stock, we have regional market clearing
KMn + K
S
n = Kn ∀n ≤ N. (3.31)
Note that since capital is immobile, we do not have market clearing condition for capital
at the aggregate level. Solving for labor allocation we get
Ln =
[ ωnPnU¯ ]
1/βKn∑
i[
ωi
PiU¯
]1/βKi
, (3.32)
where ωn is described in Eqn. 3.15.
3.2.2.4 Regional market clearing
Since final goods are only consumed (no investment opportunity), total consumption (Cn)
by whole population (Ln) must be equal to production(Qn) in both sectors j ∈ {M, S },
LnC jn = Q
j
n. (3.33)
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In terms of expenditure X jn on the final goods in sector j in island n, we find
XMn = αInLn and X
S
n = (1 − α)InLn, (3.34)
where InLn is the total income and α is the weight on manufactured goods in the utility
function (see Eqn. 3.1). The intuition of this result is that due to the Cobb-Dauglas struc-
ture of the utility function, the resultant expenditure is linear in aggregate nominal income
(follows directly from Eqn. 3.5).
Let us denote the total expenditure on intermediates bought by the n-th island from the
i-th island for producing j type final good ( j ∈ {M, S }) by X jni. Similarly, we denote the
share of that expenditure in the total revenue in the n-th island by pi jni. Since the zero-profit
condition holds, total cost must exhaust total revenue which in turn implies that the share
piMni =
XMni
XMn
=
(
Γ( f Mn )
γ/(1−γ) τ
M
niω
M
i
PMn ZMn
)−θM
. (3.35)
Recall that for the non-tradables the transportation cost is infinite (τS = ∞) and hence, For
the non-tradables,
piSnn = 1, (3.36)
which is almost tautological in the sense that the share of local production is unity in the
production of final goods in the non-tradables sector.
Let us introduce a hat notation here which simplifies the exposition of considerably.
Define
xˆ =
xnew
xold
, (3.37)
which says that the ratio of the new and the old values of any variable x, is denoted by xˆ.
This trick is useful because as Caliendo et al. [2014] shows that the whole model can be
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solved in ratios of the old and the new values of all variables rather than actually deriving
the old and the new values separately.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
Now we can define a competitive equilibrium. First, we define it for a static model which
is equivalent to assuming the time horizon T = 1. Given labor endowments {Ln} (we
normalize it so that L = 1) and the capital endowment {Kn}n, a competitive equilibrium
is an utility level U¯, factor prices {rn,wn}n, labor allocation {Ln}n, final goods expenditure
{XMn , XSn }n, consumption vector {cMn , cSn }n, prices of final goods {PMn , PSn }n and pairwise re-
gional intermediate expenditure share in every sector {piMn , piSn }n such that all markets clear
in all islands n ∈ N.
In the dynamic case with T ≥ 1, we claim that under the equilibrium configuration,
the above defined static equilibrium would hold for each and every time period t. To see
why that is true, we can use backward induction. There are two crucial assumptions in the
whole model that delivers this result. One, there is no cost involved in migration and two,
the workers decide to move after they see the realized shocks. Now consider the penulti-
mate period T − 1. When the productivity shocks occur in the period T , depending on the
relative intensities of the shocks the workers would migrate. Thus from the perspective of
period T − 1, there is no state dependence of the decision that will be made in period T .
In other words, it does not matter which island the worker belongs to to make a decision
about period T . Therefore from the perspective of period T −2, the island where a particu-
lar worker is does not matter for the decision that will be made on period T −1. Extending
the same argument, we see that right from period 1 the sequence of islands that a worker
travels, does not matter. Utilities are always equalized across islands in every period.
This is very helpful in solving the model as we can essentially solve for the labor
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allocation in each period separately after realization of the productivity shocks specific
to the island and the sectors. Another implicit assumption plays an important role here.
Note that we did not define capital ownership explicitly. The underlying idea is that the
government is the owner of all capital stock within each island. The firms rent capital from
the government who in turn distributes the proceeds to the workers. Thus even if we do
have repeated migration within these T periods i.e. the same worker can come back to
one particular island over and over again depending on productivity shocks, we have no
problem allowing that since the workers are not capital owners. In reality, we do see a
large amount of repeat migration which might relate to the issue of capital holding. For
example, Thom [2014] documents a large amount of repeat migration among workers and
links it to their savings behavior. In the present context, we chose to ignore it as it lies out
of scope of our work.
3.2.4 The effects of shocks
The above system of equations can be solved at every time point t after realization of the se-
quence of sector and island specific shocks Zˆ jnt. Given a set of parameters {θ j, α, β}Nn, j={S ,M}
and data for {In, Ln, pi jni, Zˆ jn}N,Nn,i, j={S ,M} the system yields solution for {wˆn, Lˆn, Xˆ jn, Pˆ jn, X′ jn, pi′ jni}N,Nn,i, j={M,S }
with the hat notation denoting the ratio of the new value of a variable to that of the old
value. From these we can find out the changes in real prices and output along with utility
{rˆn, pˆi jnn, Iˆ jn, ˆ¯U}Nn, j={M,S }.
3.2.5 The network of migration
Given the labor dynamics across countries, we are in a position to construct the labor mo-
bility network. Note that due to any TFP shock, all of the countries will face a fluctuation
in the efficient level of employment. Some countries will lose workers whereas others will
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Figure 3.1: An illustration of flow of workers after realization of productivity shocks.
Some countries are donor and others are receivers.
gain.
Since workers are assumed to be homogeneous both in terms of consumption pattern
and labor supply, they would show no particular preference for any country under the no-
friction regime that is when there is no friction opposing labor mobility. Recall that for
the n-th country, the total change is Lˆn. Therefore, total change for the n-th country is
(Lˆn − 1)Ln. Thus one can write the labor flow from the j-th country to the i-th country at
time t as
F tji =
 (Lˆ j − 1)L j∑
n∈Nout(Lˆn − 1)Ln
 (Lˆi − 1)Li, (3.38)
whereNout is the set of countries from which labor migrates to other countries and j ∈ Nout
. The above flow equation uses the fact that the labor is homogenous in that the inflow from
a country j to country i will be proportional to the contribution of country j relative to the
total mass of displaced workers. Note that one could alternatively write it as
F tji = −
(
(Lˆi − 1)Li∑
n∈N in(Lˆn − 1)Ln
)
(Lˆ j − 1)L j, (3.39)
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where N in is the set of countries to which labor migrates from other countries. Evidently
in absence of links to the rest of the world,
∑
i∈N in
(Lˆi − 1)Li = −
∑
j∈Nout
(Lˆ j − 1)L j, (3.40)
that is total inflow must be equal to total outflow.
With a single realization of a set of shocks across the sectors and the islands, there
will be donors and receivers. Those island that experienced relatively better shocks will be
ranked higher in relative attractiveness. Thus workers will migrate to the receivers. There-
fore, at every point of time such a set of shocks would generate a directed and weighted
network of migrants. But this network would be unidirectional in the sense that labor flow
is always one-way between any pair. However, with repeated shocks in the steady state,
an island that was a net donor in one period, may turn out to be a net receiver the next
period. Thus in general over sufficient number of time points (with large enough T ), we
will generate bilateral flow for each and every possible pairs of islands. Evidently the net
flow (inflow-outflow) would be much smaller than the gross flow (inflow+outflow). This
is another characteristic of model that matches the data well, for example in case of U.S.
the gross flow is about 10 times larger than the net flow as has been documented in Kaplan
and Schulhofer-Wohl [2013].
3.3 Results
We calibrate the parameters (see Table 3.1 for the numerical values) of the theoretical
model for two sets of data. The first one is for 15 of the countries in the European Union
and Norway. The second one is for the states of U.S. In both cases, as mentioned earlier we
will not be seeing any ‘South’ to ‘North’ kind of migration. The islands in both the cases
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have inherent homogeneity. However, institutional frictions should be much clear in the
EU countries. In the following, we discuss the 2 datasets (U.S. and European countries)
briefly and then compare the results from the theoretical model with the real data. The
shape parameters (of the shock distribution z) θ describe competitiveness in production
process. Its value is taken to be the average value of θ computed in Eaton and Kortum
[2002] which shows that it varies over a long range from 3.60 to 12.86. We have rounded
the average value to the nearest digit to keep it simple. For the same value describing the
service sector, we chose a smaller value for it to indicate a higher range of heterogeneity
in the service sector. However, it does not really matter because in the current formulation,
service goods are not traded. Another important point is that while generating the shocks
to the productivity Z, we divided each shock by the length of the time horizon T to keep
the system in the steady state. Thus, for any i−th sector
ψit =
ψ˜it
T
where ψ˜ ∼ N(1, σ), (3.41)
so that
T∑
t
ψit =
T∑
t
ψ˜it
T
→ 1 for T → ∞. (3.42)
The values given are for U.S. For Europe only the standard deviation of the shocks differ
as the time-series of shocks are different in the European countries. However this does not
change anything qualitatively.
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Table 3.1: Parameter values calibrated for simulation purpose (U.S.)
Description parameter value
Service goods’ share in cost 1-α 0.6
Capital share in cost β 0.3
Dispersion of shocks: Manufacturing θm 8
Dispersion of shocks: Service θs 2
Std. dev. of shocks: Manufacturing σM 0.0380
Std. dev. of shocks: Service σS 0.0057
Length of simulation T 200
# simulations averaged - O(10)
3.3.1 The migration network of Europe
We look into migration data from 2000 to 2007 for 16 countries (see Sec. 3.7.2 for details
on sources of data) which gives us the full 16×16 migration matrix depicting the bilateral
flow.. Our objective is to build the complete matrix from the theoretical model and com-
pare each element with the data. However, there is incompleteness in the available data
showing the bilateral flow of labor as a few countries do not report the migration statistics
at all, some countries stop reporting after a period of time and some start only after a time
point. So we extract the maximum amount of data available and compare it with the results
that the theoretical model provides.
98
Table 3.2: Descriptive summary for EU bilateral migration (16 countries)
Year Obesrvations Mean Std.Dev Min Max
2000 66 5056.924 8813.484 0 45439
2001 66 5231.076 9290.369 0 43375.5
2002 66 5377.379 9570.473 2 41312
2003 66 5203.114 9455.308 6 49670
2004 66 5608.924 10292.27 3 59337
2005 66 5830.758 10729.29 7 57652
2006 69 5239.217 10345.33 8 56612
2007 66 4307.53 7815.329 16 34417
To simulate the bilateral migration - driven by productivity shocks from the theoretical
model we use a block recursive algorithm (see Sec. 3.7.4). We use the parameter values
described in 3.1, and provide the population data for the countries (Li; we normalize it so
that
∑
i Li = 1), the per-capita GDP and the bilateral trade relationship between countries
(pim and pis) as inputs of the model (see Sec. 3.7.4). Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3 provide snapshots
of the data for a single year, 2000. From Fig. 3.3 we can see that sectoral shocks are highly
asymmetric across countries. To capture this pattern, we estimate the degree of variation
of the shocks across sectors.
We compare the theoretical results (referred to henceforth as TFP driven migration)
with the actual data of migration. In order to compare meaningfully, we consider the dyads
for which actual migration data is available (both mi j and m ji) and sum it up (mi j + m ji) to
get rid of the direction of migration and regress this on its theoretical counterpart, the TFP
driven migration (theoretical mi j + m ji).
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Figure 3.2: Data description for EU countries for the year 2000: GDP per capita and
normalized population
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Figure 3.3: Data description for EU countries for the year 2000: TFP distribution
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From the model we get that due to TFP differences net migration in the 16 countries
should be around 2%. In the next table we regress the dyad specific bilateral migrations
from actual data on the TFP driven migration results (from theoretical model). Table 3.3
contains results of regressing data on model-predicted migration. To do that we construct
the l.h.s. variable as
yk =
mdatai j + m
data
ji∑
n Ldatan
. (3.43)
We normalize the migration flow by the total population so that we can talk about total
flow of migration in percentage terms. Similarly, we construct the regressor as
xk =
mmodeli j + m
model
ji∑
n Lmodeln
. (3.44)
Note that we already normalized the labor allocation in the model so that the denominator
is 1. In the regression we control for contiguity which is a dummy variable showing
whether two countries in a dyad shares a border or not.
101
Table 3.3: Regression results for EU - Nominal
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept Adjusted R2
2000 0.05836∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.77380
2001 0.05870∗∗∗ 0.00002∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.76270
2002 0.06118∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.77240
2003 0.05456∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.63560
2004 0.05709∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.58090
2005 0.06132∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.66860
2006 0.06376∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.68340
2007 0.06030∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.73690
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
We find from Table 3.3 that though the coefficient of TFP driven migration is much
lower than 1 which should have been the case if the model match the data perfectly, but
it is significant and in each year the model has sufficiently high R2. This is an interesting
finding as it basically suggests that the total mass of migrants predicted by the model is
much higher than what is seen in the data. A legitimate question at this point would be
how do know that the model predicted mass of migrants have any real meaning at all? In
the next section we answer that question by showing that it describes the U.S. migration
process with reasonably high accuracy. The gross flow of migrants in the model matches
U.S. data pretty well. To account for the discrepancies in the total flow, we divide the
relevant variables on both sides of the regression by the sum of the all values of weights
that is the new l.h.s. variable is y˜k = yk/
∑
k yk and the regressor is x˜k = xk/
∑
k xk. The
control variable remains as is.
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Table 3.4: Regression results for EU - Relative
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept Adjusted R2
2000 0.84328∗∗∗ 0.01700∗∗∗ -0.00046 0.77380
2001 0.83180∗∗∗ 0.01779∗∗∗ -0.00042 0.76270
2002 0.85237∗∗∗ 0.01418∗∗∗ -0.00013 0.77240
2003 0.79403∗∗∗ 0.01494∗∗∗ 0.00063 0.63560
2004 0.77543∗∗∗ 0.01344∗∗ 0.00116 0.58090
2005 0.81675∗∗∗ 0.01351∗∗ 0.00052 0.66860
2006 0.75724∗∗∗ 0.01441∗∗∗ 0.00122 0.68340
2007 0.71356∗∗∗ 0.01980∗∗∗ 0.00104 0.73690
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
The results are presented in Table 3.4. Evidently, the estimated coefficient is now about
0.8 which is much closer to 1. Note that y˜ , x˜ ∈ [0, 1] making them comparable in order.
So in relative sense the theoretical model does quite well in explaining the migration in
Europe. However, the it does not match the total migration; in fact predicts a much higher
value.
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Figure 3.4: Scatter plots showing the normalized actual dyad migration data on TFP sim-
ulated results for the European countries for year 2000: Relative - normalized values
In the Fig. 3.5 on the left panel we plot the normalized bilateral migration data on the
y-axis and the predicted values of the same on the x- axis. In the right panel we take the
natural log of both variables to reduce the effects of the outliers. Each point on the scatter
plot denotes the real data and the prediction for a dyad.
3.3.2 The migration network for USA
To check robustness of the mechanism and to test the model on a frictionless benchmark
case, we redo the above exercise on USA. We plug in data of population, per capita GDP,
bilateral trade and TFP distribution for 51 states in the model to generate a migration
network. The American Community Survey (ACS) provides data of interstate migration
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Figure 3.5: Scatter plots showing the normalized actual dyad migration data on TFP sim-
ulated results for the European countries for year 2000: Log relative - log of normalized
values
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for 2007. Other years are not available.
Table 3.5 shows the results of regressing actual data (at level values - nominal and nor-
malized - relative) on theoretical model results. Even at the nominal level the table shows
that TFP changes can explain most of the migration seen in real data. These regressions
are also on dyad observations and do not consider the direction of flow of migration. The
interesting result is that the predicted total mass of migrants match pretty well with the
data. Calibrating the model we see that the total flow should be around 2%. From pre-
viously mentioned ACS data we do get the overall migration to be around 2%. Thus the
orders of the variables are perfectly comparable.
Table 3.5: Regression results for US
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept Adjusted R2
Nominal 0.82695∗∗∗ 0.00006∗∗∗ 0.00000
0.62990
Relative 0.68521∗∗∗ 0.00243∗∗∗ 0.00004
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
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Figure 3.6: Scatter plots showing the normalized interstate migration data on the simula-
tion results for US year 2007, in level and in log: Relative - normalized values
Fig. 3.7 plots the normalized actual interstate migration on the normalized values
of migration predicted. In the right panel we take natural log - showing a very clear
clustering around the fitted line. Evidently, the bulk of the labor flow is captured by the
theoretical model which emphasizes the productivity-driven migration in line of Klein
and Ventura [2009] and Kennan and Walker [2011]. That is, in case of U.S. which was
taken as the closest approximation to a frictionless place (in terms of social and political
dimensions), is actually described well by a model emphasizing only economic incentives
behind migration.
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Figure 3.7: Scatter plots showing the normalized interstate migration data on the simula-
tion results for US year 2007, in level and in log: Log relative - log of normalized values
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3.3.3 Working of the model: multilateral gravity equations
From the tables presented above, the model explains about 63% of the fluctuations in edge
weight of the migration network in case of U.S. (see Table 3.5)) controlling for contigu-
ity. Similarly, in case of Europe the model explains about 70% on an average (see Table
3.4). In both cases the coefficient assigned to the TFP-driven migration is sufficiently high
(about 0.8 on an average). The reason the model fits well with the data is that it effectively
creates a network that describes a multilateral gravity equation between all pairs of islands.
The basic descriptive equation of gross flow of labor between any dyad i.e. any pair ({i, j})
of islands is
Fi, j = Ci, j
Li.L jdηi, j
 , (3.45)
where the Fi, j is the weight of the edge of the network between the i−th and the j−th
island (representing trade flow or migration) and C is a constant. The equation shows that
the labor flow is proportional to the product of the two islands’ population and inversely
proportional to some power of the distance (dηi, j) between these two islands. Usually, η is
found to be very close to 1. The emergence of such a pattern have been subject to a huge
number of empirical studies in the trade theoretic literature. Chaney [2014]) in particular
gives a framework to understand why η is close to one. In the present context, we do
not attempt to embed distance in the model. Therefore, in all empirical analysis we have
controlled for it by using contiguity data. For the same reason, a reduced form description
of our model is
Fi, j = Ci, j(Li.L j). (3.46)
Fig. 3.8 describes the relationship generated by the model, between weights of the dyads in
terms of labor flow and products of populations of the corresponding countries. Evidently
it has a good fit with the idea of multilateral gravity approach except that there is no
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counterpart of distance in our model (following Eqn. 3.46).
Figure 3.8: Multilateral gravity equation : the model captures the multilateral gravity
relation between donor and receiver countries. We have plotted the weight of dyads (mi j +
m ji) as a function of the product of populations (Li.L j) for all dyads i, j ∈ N
Since in case of European union the distances between the countries do not have par-
ticularly large variations, the weights of the dyads capturing the migration flow depend
almost linearly on the product of population. This is precisely what our model generates
in terms of labor flow. Thus the relationship can be further simplified to
Fi, j = C(Li.L j). (3.47)
Thus the model captures the broad description of the migration network at the macro level
as well as country-pair specific level. An interesting feature of the model is that Ci, j = C as
is shown in Fig. 3.8. This constant parameter C embodies the structure of the economy in
the sense that it captures the structural parameters of the global economy (in our case, the
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EU or the U.S.) including the preferences, production technology and the trade patterns.
When we make any changes in such structural parameteres, that will be reflected in the
magnitude of that constant and will have corresponding effects on the level of migration.
We study such cases in Sec. 3.5.
3.4 European immobility puzzle
One of the basic principles behind the formation of the European union was to ensure
freedom of movement of productive inputs. In particular, it was supposed to reduce the
barriers in the labor flow making the market more flexible. Multilateral gravity equation
helps us to pin down the relative strengths of the edges of the migration network. However,
as is clear from the above results, the model shows that under reasonable parameterization
the predicted mass of migrants are in the order of 100 times more than what is seen in
Europe for the period we considered (2000-07). This refers to the puzzle that even after
the legal and political barriers have been systematically removed thus potentially reducing
economic frictions on the labor allocation process, people did not respond immediately
to the existing incentives. This problem has attracted attentions both from theoretical and
policy-making point of view. In particular, Belot and Ederveen [2012] ascribes this role
to the negative effects of cultural differences indicating that such distances can induce an
extremely low migratory response if properly addressed. In this chapter, we complement
this analysis using many other types of frictions ranging from social to political along with
the obvious factor, lingual differences. Generally, in this section we look into a list of fine-
grained measures of institutional differences between the 16 European countries and argue
that these substitute some of the TFP driven migration instead of complementing and thus,
provide “frictions” opposing the incentives.
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3.4.1 Distances in institution and culture
We look at a broad list of variables which could ideally be considered as frictions. We
start with historical links between countries. We used the CEPII data to determine colonial
links between countries or whether the two countries in the dyad were the same country
historically.
One of the hypothesis could be that language barrier is one of the reasons which stops
people from migrating easily. To control for this we looked into several language indices.
From the CEPII, bilateral data on whether two countries speak same official language,
native language, language proximity index and common language index was obtained. In
Table 3.6, LangIndex is the common language index. This index gives an approximate
distance between two countries due to language. If the index is higher that means the two
countries have less language barriers. We also looked into Ethnologue language statistics
- country specific data on total number of languages used as first language, immigrant
languages in the country and probability that two people selected at random will have
different mother tongues (Greenberg’s diversity index).
Differences in culture could be another barrier to migration - to control for this we
use the Hofstede’s cultural indices. This is a rich set of index encompassing cultural as-
pects such as individualism versus collectivism in the economy, uncertainty avoidance,
power distance (strength of social hierarchy), masculinity-femininity (task orientation ver-
sus person-orientation), long-term orientation and indulgence versus self-restraint. In Ta-
ble 3.6 ‘Indiv’ refers to Individualism and ‘Pragm’ refers to Pragmatism and they are two
of the Hofstede cultural index. These indices are country specific. For dyad level regres-
sion we considered the numerical differences between these indices for the two countries
as a proxy of their ‘distance’ in the corresponding category. So a higher value in distance
for ‘individualism’ between a pair of countries would mean that one country in the pair
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Figure 3.10: Institutional indices for European countries: Shadow economy and freedom
of press in 2001
believes in individualistic society as a way of life and the other country believes in a rela-
tively less individualistic society which is another way of saying that the country believes
in a more collective/family-oriented way of life.
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Figure 3.9: Cultural indices for European countries: Hofstede index: individualism &
pragmatism
Next we considered several stability indices broadly related to the polity. All data were
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collected from various reports compiled and made publicly available by World Bank. We
looked into government stability, democracy index, ethnic tensions, religious conflicts,
military in politics and external conflicts to understand the political stability in the econ-
omy. For each of these risk rating available on country level we considered the ‘distance’
between the ratings between two countries for dyad regressions. For socio-economic sta-
bility we looked into corruption index, freedom of press, socio-economic conditions and
voice and accountability. Distance between financial stability indices like financial risk
rating, investment profile and existence of shadow economy are also included as controls.
Distance in shadow economy index would mean in the dyad one of the countries has a
huge underground economy and the other one does not.
We also looked into some of the Europe specific dummies - such as using euro or not
and entry into European union. In the next section we look into the regression results on
all the mentioned distance variables.
A general rule we followed is that since many of these frictional variables are extremely
correlated especially so when they belong to the same family. We use stepwise regression
methodology to pin down the predictors. Most of the considered ‘friction’ variables under
an umbrella term broadly defining similar characteristics, are correlated. For example,
Table 3.8 shows the correlation matrix a number of variables that belong to a broad class of
political stability indicators. Given this level of correlation in the data, we do not consider
all variables simultaneously as that will not increase the predictive power. The point is
that many of the frictional variables that turns out to be important in explaining the puzzle,
are not unique. They often have some other measures, almost similarly defined and hence
very correlated, that can be almost equally effective in explaining the same phenomena.
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3.4.2 Explaining the missing flow: effects of institutional factors
For the 16 countries in Europe (same as Sec. 3.3.1) we computed all the institutional dis-
tance measures. As a response variable we consider the ratio of actual bilateral migration
data to TFP driven migration. We regress this on the various institutional measures. The
results are tabulated in Table 3.6. The reason we took the ratio of the data to the model
(yk/xk as defined in Eqn. 3.43 and 3.44 resp.) as the variable to be explained is that this
way we get rid of the gravity-effects which is driven solely by economic causes. Thus the
left over variations would be driven by other non-economic factors. Two methodologi-
cal points are to be noted. One, some variation in the data could be due to misreporting
which we cannot rectify and two, we are considering the model to capture the economic
incentives completely and in the gravity equation set up, the proportionality term captures
all institutional effects, magnifying or lessening the flow. Consider any pair {i, j} of dyad
k. Given this interpretation, note that yk = Cdatai j .Li.L j/d
η
i j and xk = C
model
i j .Li.L j/d
η
i j and
from Fig. 3.8, we see that Cmodeli, j is roughly a constant, independent of the specific dyad
considered (i.e. Cmodeli, j = C
model). Thus the idea is that a low value of the variable (yk/xk
) indicates that less migration occurred between a pair of countries consisting the dyad k
in reality, than in the model. Therefore, a negative value of the coefficient of a suitably
defined distance metric would indicate presence of a friction. Alternatively, in presence of
similarities in any dimension for example, lingual, we would expect a higher flow.
Table 3.6 shows the regression results for the European country dyads. For each year,
from 2000 to 2007, we regress ratio of actual bilateral migration data to TFP driven mi-
gration on Euro currency dummy and distance between -language index, Hofstede index
of individualism (vs. collectivism) and pragmatism, financial risk and shadow economy,
controlling for contiguity. The financial risk index is constructed following a methodology
similar to the one used by International Country Risk Guide [2015], on a set of broadly de
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ned macro indices collected from IMF [2014] (e.g. exchange rate stability, debt-to-
GDP ratio, current account surplus etc). We also tested for various political risk factors
which did not turn out to be significant.
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Table 3.6: Regression results for EU - frictions
Contiguity LangIndex Indivi Pragm Euro FinRiskInd ShadowEco Intercept AdjR2
2000 0.23∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.05 0.02 -0.01∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.45
2001 0.26∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.06 0.02∗ -0.01∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.47
2002 0.21∗∗ 0.39∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.07 0.02 -0.01∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.43
2003 0.22∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.06 0.03∗ -0.01 0.61∗∗∗ 0.45
2004 0.18∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.06 0.02∗ -0.01 0.67∗∗∗ 0.43
2005 0.18∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.06 0.02 -0.01∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.41
2006 0.18∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ -0.07∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.09 0.01 -0.01∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.33
2007 0.16∗ 0.56∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.02∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.40
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
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The signs of the coefficients have meaningful interpretation - for example having simi-
lar language helps in migration (positive signs of the LangIndex) and different cultures act
as an impediment to migration (negative signs for distance between cultural index). This
exercise shows that there are factors which encourage or discourage migration, over and
above mere economic incentives.
3.5 Counterfactuals
The model that we have presented above captures the economy in a very short horizon
of time. But it is well known that over a considerable amount of time several economic
variables do change substantially. The empirical observation of structural shift is probably
the most prominent example of it which states that over time the service sector tends to
dominate the manufacturing sector (Acemoglu [2007]). Another interesting observation
is that the level of migration itself shows time-varying properties, for example even in the
U.S. there exists a secular decline in the aggregate level of interstate migration. It has
shown about 50% fall over the period of last two decades (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl
[2013]). Similarly in a growing economy, any particular sector taken in isolation, shows
a secular increase in per-capita capital stock. In the context of the present model, we can
use parametric variations to understand the changes in the behavior of economic incentive-
driven migration process in face of these long-run changes in the ‘deep parameters’ of the
economy.
The general prediction of the model in all of the following exercises remains valid in
the sense labor flow network essentially captures the multilateral gravity equation type be-
havior. By making parametric variations, we can study how total mass of labor migration
alters when subjected to productivity shocks. One can think of such exercises as reflecting
changes the coefficient of the gravity equation (the term multiplying the labor mass, C in
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Eqn. 3.45)
3.5.1 Structural change
The shift of employment from agriculture to manufacturing and then eventually to service
sector is referred to as structural change (Acemoglu [2007]). Of course, in the modern age
agriculture has mostly become obsolete in most of the developed countries and the speed at
which this change takes place differ from country to country. However, the gradual shift of
employment from manufacturing to service are present beneath the facade of growth pro-
cess of modern economies almost without any exception. There is a large literature making
connections between economic growth and structural change (see Acemoglu [2007] for a
detailed analysis). In the present context, the effects of structural change on economic
growth is not important per se. But since this refers to an ever-increasing share of service
goods in the consumption basket (assuming a demand-driven structural change), we see an
increase in size of the non-tradable sector. This will have important consequences for labor
migration pattern at the aggregate level. Redding et al. [2012] builds a model of structural
change on a framework similar to ours and explains the movement of labor away from
agriculture resulting in urbanization over a century. Instead we take the phenomena of
structural change as given and by parametric variation of preference, we seek to determine
the effects on migratory responses.
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Figure 3.12: Evolution of employment in the service sector in a set of countries. This
clearlys shows an unidirectional change in favor of service indicating a structural shift
(compare with Fig. 3.11). Due to this movement away from tradables to non-tradables, it
would affect the level of migration.
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Figure 3.11: Evolution of employment in the manufacturing sector in a set of countries.
There are broadly two ways to capture the structural change. One interpretation is
that it is demand-driven that is over time people demand more service goods than man-
ufactured goods (see for example Echevarria [1997] for a preference-driven mechanism).
The simplest way to address this issue in the current context is to do comparative static
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between to economies with different preference for manufactured goods. For comparison,
we assume a symmetric economy consisting of N = 10 islands where all islands have
equal share in initial population (Ln = 1/N∀n) and then trade matrix is perfectly symmet-
ric in the sense that all elements are 1/N indicating equal weights attached to all islands
by all islands and per-capita GDP is normalized at 1 for every island. With α = 0.7 and
β = 0.3, the total mass of people migrating is about 1.5% whereas if we reduce α to 0.4,
the corresponding value is about 1.6% indicating a marginal increase. The interpretation
is that with higher weight attached to service goods, that sector becomes more important
which is non-tradable. The productivity shocks in the non-tradable sector cannot be mit-
igated through trade by definition. Thus it shows a higher level of adjustment in terms of
the only movable input, labor. The elasticity of migration with respect to changes in the
preference parameter is seen to be low reflecting the idea that structural change does not
have a pronounced effect on migration.
3.5.2 Increasing asymmetries in the trade network
The trade network (interstate or intra-Europe) is extremely skewed as has been docu-
mented in several studies. For example Chaney [2014] shows regional asymmetries in
trade flow whereas Foerster et al. [2011] and Acemoglu et al. [2012] emphasizes the sec-
toral aspect of it. Such asymmetries in trade network also affects the migration process as
that network is the medium of transmission of idiosyncratic sectoral and spatial shocks to
other sectors and islands. Thus different degree of asymmetry in the trade network would
imply different levels of spill-over effects of such shocks4 and would eventually result in
different levels of migration responses.
In the benchmark case, we assume that share of manufactured goods in the consump-
4In fact, this is shown very elegantly by Caliendo et al. [2014] although they include an input-output
channel as well which we have ignored for our purpose.
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tion bundle (α) is 0.4 and the share of capital in the production function (β) is 0.3 and a
completely symmetric trade matrix with all elements 1/N, N being the number of islands.
From that we make the trade matrix completely asymmetric in the sense that it is set to
be equal to an identity matrix, effectively making it manufacturing non-tradable good.
The mass of people migrating under this set of parameter values, is about 1.8% whereas
the mass of migrants in the benchmark case is 1.6%. This indicates that again a similar
mechanism at work. More emphasis on non-tradables increase the extent of adjustment
process.
3.5.3 Capital deepening
The economic growth process is almost synonymous with accumulation of capital of dif-
ferent varieties. Thus over time the production process uses more and more capital in-
tensive technology. In the context of non-balanced economic growth this phenomena has
been studied by Acemoglu and Guierrieri [2008] among others. In the present model, such
dependence of capital intensive technology will evidently affect the migratory responses
of workers. The benchmark case is the same as in the above case (Sec. 3.5.2). By increas-
ing the capital intensity in the production process (β) to 0.7, we find that the total mass
of migrants become almost half of the benchmark scenario. This is intuitive because the
less labor required in the production process, the less would be the extent of adjustment.
However, a potential limitation of this exercise is that in the model capital is fixed. Thus
labor movement becomes much more pronounced as that is the only factor that can be ad-
justed which is manifested in the high magnitude of the migration elasticity with respect
to capital intensity.
122
3.6 Summary and conclusion
We have presented a model of migration based on a richly specified structure originally
developed in the trade theoretic literature following the Eaton-Kortum model (Eaton and
Kortum [2002]). We employ a technique originally developed by Caliendo et al. [2014] to
pin down the migratory responses in a static multi-country, multi-sector economy. Essen-
tially, we treated the model as representing a general equilibrium set-up. In steady state,
the system is subjected to consecutive shocks under realistic parameterization and from
that we generate an directed and weighted network of migration. We calibrate the model
to U.S. and a set of European countries (it is the lack of data on the latter that forced us
to focus on a subset rather than the all countries). The model performs well in explaining
the total network of labor flow across U.S. and it matches the gross flow of labor with
the real data. Interestingly, the model matches the relative flow network for the European
countries pretty well but predicts a much higher value of gross flow of labor than is seen
in the data.
The predictive power of the model lies in the fact that it essentially generates a multi-
lateral gravity equation in labor flow thus capturing the relative weights pretty well. But
the gross flow depends not only on economic factors but also on an array of institutional
factors that comprises various social, political and lingual dimensions. The good match of
the data with the model in case of U.S. indicates the (institutional) frictionless character
of interstate migration. However, when we study the differences between model and data
in case of the European countries, several factors emerge as dominant frictions reducing
migratory responses even in face of economic incentives. Common language turns out to
be an important factor, so are several other social characteristics (individualism and prag-
matism). The presence of informality in the form of shadow economy also affects the
migration decision to a great extent along with financial stability.
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A simplifying assumption made throughout the exercise that makes the model tractable,
is that people migrate for economic incentives only. While there are other reasons (for ex-
ample, family-related or retirement-related), this is broadly consistent with the data (Ken-
nan and Walker [2011]). An important issue was raised by Molloy et al. [2011] regarding
the effects of the housing sector on migration. While it is true that there are several in-
stances of sudden increase in country-specific migration due to housing sector boom, in
general that does not play an important role. The present model could be easily augmented
with a housing sector. But Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl [2013] argues that the housing
sector shows much more volatility than the process of migration which is highly inertial.
Molloy et al. [2011] considered this particular channel and showed that there exists a very
weak connections if any, in case of U.S. There are two other simplifications that allows
us to solve the model based on the framework provided by Caliendo et al. [2014]. The
first is regarding the technical issue that labor is the only mobile factor. Secondly, we
have assumed that labor is homogeneous. This assumption implies that labor is perfectly
substitutable across countries (islands) and sectors. Thus we do not have to keep track of
different types of labor migrating all over the world (the set of islands considered). While
this assumption restricts us from discussing other issues like skill-specific migration, we
retain it because of the tractability it provides to the model.
Given the static nature of the model an important question crops up that can we make
long-run predictions from this model? We have discussed three important scenarios that
provides us corresponding results which are obtained by appropriate changes in the deep
parameters describing the economy. However, since by nature the model is not dynamic,
we do not expect it to pick up the effects of economic fundamentals like a growing capital
stock which might aggravate or reduce the degree of migratory responses generated from
the model. But the results would broadly mimic the present as the current model takes the
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most basic incentive to migrate into account.
Finally, we can ask a seemingly obvious question : why did we take social distances
as a friction? Would it be possible to imagine a scenario where a higher social distance
actually complements migratory responses rather than substituting it. The answer is, it is
possible. In south-to-north migration this may in fact provide an incentive to migrate. For
example, people would migrate from low income countries to comparatively prosperous
but only selectively. Along with economic incentives, migrants also weigh their chances
on the socio-political conditions of the receiving countries. Thus a higher distance between
a donor country and a receiver country may compel individuals to migrate. However,
when the countries are more-or-less similar in these respects, this might hinder the labor
reallocation process as is found in case of the European countries.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Abstract
In this chapter we devise a theory of cross-country migration in the form of labor mobility
based on regional and sectoral productivity shocks in a multi-country, multi-sector setting.
Country-specific sociological and institutional factors induce a friction on such labor re-
allocation process driven by economic incentives. We use country level data to show how
country to country migration can be determined by industrial composition in the countries,
shocks in factor productivity in the regionally concentrated sectors and spatial dispersion
of these shocks. The model explains both the nominal and relative flow of workers across
U.S. well, which is taken as the frictionless benchmark case. On the other hand, when
applied to Europe the model explains the relative flow network well, but predicts a higher
nominal flow than is seen in the data indicating a missing mass of migrants. We use dyad
regression to analyze the effects of institutional distance, which broadly captures the socio-
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cultural differences between countries to explain the lack of cross-country labor mobility.
We show that lingual differences explain most of the ‘European immobility puzzle’.
Keywords: Network of labor mobility, cross-country migration, sectoral productivity, re-
gional productivity, gravity equation.
3.7.2 Sources of data
For the European Union we looked into bilateral migration from 2000 to 2007 within Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Germany, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Italy, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia, United Kingdom and Norway. Migration is
defined as movement across different countries of residence in one year. More specifically,
if a person was in a different country of residence in the previous year than this year, then
we count that person as a migrant.
Table 3.7: Data Sources
Data Source
Migration - EU Eurostat [2015]
Contiguity - EU CEPII [2015]
Cultural Indices Hofstede et al. [2010]
Economic Indicators World Bank Reports [2011]
Migration - US American Community Survey Data [2007]
Financial indices IMF [2014]
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Table 3.8: Correlation matrix for political stability indices
Voiceacc Polstab Govteffec Reg quality Ruleoflaw Corrupt Transparency
Voiceacc 1.00
Polstab 0.83 1.00
Govteffec 0.83 0.72 1.00
Regulation quality 0.56 0.53 0.72 1.00
Ruleoflaw 0.91 0.84 0.94 0.63 1.00
Corruptcont 0.93 0.84 0.91 0.66 0.96 1.00
TransparencyCPI 0.91 0.76 0.85 0.56 0.91 0.91 1.00
3.7.3 Equilibrium conditions
The basic references for solving this types of models are Caliendo and Parro [2014] and
Caliendo et al. [2014]. Below, we list the equilibrium conditions. We normalize the popu-
lation so that L = 1 in the following.
• Labor mobility conditions (N equations):
Lˆn =
( ωˆn
Pˆn
)1/β∑
n Ln(
ωˆn
Pˆn
)1/β
L, (3.48)
where
Pˆn = (PˆMn )
α(PˆSn )
1−α. (3.49)
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• Regional market clearing conditions (2N equations):
X j
′
n = α
j(ωˆn(Lˆn)1−βInLn), (3.50)
where the index j refers to sectors M and S .
• Price index (2N equations):
Pˆ jn = (
N∑
i=1
pi
j
ni(xˆ
j
i )
−θ j(Zˆ ji )
θ j)−1/θ
j
, (3.51)
where the index j refers to sectors M and S .
• Trade shares (2N2 equations):
pi
j′
ni = pi
j
ni(
xˆ ji
Pˆ jn
)−θ
j
(Zˆ ji )
θ j , (3.52)
where the index j refers to sectors M and S .
• Labor market clearing (N equations):
ωˆn(Lˆn)(1−β)InLn =
∑
j
∑
i
pi
j′
inX
j′
i , (3.53)
where the index j refers to sectors M and S .
3.7.4 Solution algorithm
The system can be solved block recursively. We are follow the algorithm presented in
Caliendo et al. [2014] for solving the labor allocation problem resulting from asymmetric
productivity shocks and then ammend it and modify it to suit our purpose. Below we
present the steps to be followed for solving the model. Consider exogenous changes in
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productivity ZˆMn , Zˆ
S
n for all n. Define an weight f ∈ (0, 1) to be used to update the guess.
In practice, f = 0.99 works well.
• Guess relative change in regional factor prices ωˆ.
• Set xˆ jn = ωˆn and
Pˆ jn = (
N∑
i=1
pi
j
ni(xˆ
j
i )
−θ j(Zˆ ji )
θ j)−1/θ
j
. (3.54)
• Find
pi
j′
ni = pi
j
ni(
xˆ ji
Pˆ jn
κˆ
j
ni)
−θ j(Zˆ ji )
θ j . (3.55)
• Find
Lˆn =
( ωˆn
Pˆn
)1/β∑
n Ln(
ωˆn
Pˆn
)1/β
L, (3.56)
where
Pˆn = (PˆMn )
α(PˆSn )
1−α. (3.57)
• Find
X j
′
n = α
j(ωˆn(Lˆn)1−βInLn). (3.58)
• Find
ωˆnew =
∑
i pi
j′
inX
j′
i
Lˆ(1−β)n (InLn)
(3.59)
• Update the guess by
ωˆ∗ = f .ωˆ + (1 − f ).ωˆnew (3.60)
• Stop if ||ωˆ − ωˆ∗|| ≤ , else go back to the first point above.
• Find net labor inflow,
Fn = (Lˆn − 1)Ln. (3.61)
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• Construct the network of labor flow,
Fi j = −
 (Lˆ j − 1)L j∑
n∈Nout(Lˆn − 1)Ln
 (Lˆi − 1)Li, (3.62)
where Nout is the set of countries from which labor migrates to other countries and
j ∈ Nout . This process generates an directed labor flow network.
• Define a new matrix, F = triu(abs(F+F′)) where the operator triu(.) gives the upper
triangular part and abs(.) denotes absolute value of their respective arguments.
Thus one would generate the directed, weighted network between N islands. With
repeated shocks for T periods, one would have T networks each for each period. Summing
over them one can generate the final network. We have averaged the final network thus
produced over O(10) realizations to arrive at a stable network free of fluctuations in the
edge weights.
3.7.5 Welfare evaluation
In this section we briefly discuss the welfare effects that result from changes in productiv-
ity. As has been discussed above, the model is solved in terms of ratios of the variables.
We apply the same idea to discuss changes in utility. One aspect of the model is that even
though all allocation resulting from productivity shocks are Pareto optimal. However, in
principle as a response to productivity shocks, the labor might move away so much that
total production may go down even though that would be the optimal (see Caliendo et al.
[2014] for more on this feature).
Since at optimal, utility is equalized across all islands we can consider any generic
island n to study the welfare effects. From equations (3.6), (3.17) and (3.18) we can write
the change in welfare as Uˆ = wˆn/Pˆn. Using equation (3.35) and (3.36) with the definition
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of Pn we can write
ln Uˆ =
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
ln Aˆ jn + ln
wˆn
ωˆ
j
n
)
, (3.63)
where all notations are defined before except A which denotes measured productivity i.e.
Aˆ jn = Zˆ
j
n/pˆi
j
nn and αM = α, αS = 1 − α. The welfare calculation is easier under a no-trade
scenario for the manufactured goods so that we can disregard the contribution of own share
in the production process pinn. We can expand the second term as
ln
wˆn
ωˆ
j
n
= βln
wˆn
rˆn
= βln
1
Lˆn
. (3.64)
The first equality holds from the definition of the unit cost ω in Eqn. 3.15 and the second
follows from the optimality conditions of the firms (Eqn. 3.17 and 3.18).
Since we see that the actual migration in case of the EU is far less than that of the
prediction, there would be a welfare loss arising out of lower rate of adjustment. To assess
the welfare loss, we need some notations. Assume that the original magnitudes of the
shocks and the labor allocation across islands are {Z} and {L} respectively. The actual
shocks that take place is {Z′′}. The corresponding optimal labor allocation should be {L′′}.
But we observe a labor allocation {L′} with much smaller adjustments. Let us denote
the shocks required to generate the observed level of migration by {Z′} (which is much
smaller than {Z′′}). Let us denote the optimal response to shocks by a pair {Z′′, L′′} and the
corresponding utility level U |{Z′′},{L′′}. But we do have the actual response {Z′′, L′} and the
corresponding utlity level U |{Z′′},{L′}≤ U |{Z′′},{L′′}.
Now we can write,
U |{Z′′},{L′}
U |{Z′′},{L′′} =
U |{Z},{L}
U |{Z′′},{L′′}︸     ︷︷     ︸
term1
U |{Z′},{L′}
U |{Z},{L}︸    ︷︷    ︸
term2
U |{Z′′},{L′}
U |{Z′},{L′}︸    ︷︷    ︸
term3
(3.65)
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Terms 1 and 2 denote the utility changes due to optimal response to productivity
shocks. The third term has identical labor and capital allocation but different levels of
shocks. Note also that if the manufactured goods are not traded, then the measured pro-
ductivity is actual productivity and hence, A = Z. Therefore, we have
ln Uˆ =
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
ln Zˆ jn − βlnLˆn
)
, (3.66)
This in turn implies that for small shocks we can linearize the expression to derive
Uˆ ' 1 +
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
ln Zˆ jn − βlnLˆn
)
. (3.67)
To derive the last equality we have used an approximation that
lim
x→0
ex ≈ 1 + x. (3.68)
Notice that the difference between term 1 and 2 in Eqn. 3.65 is the degree of productivity
shocks. According to the real data the actual response ({L′} − {L}) is in the order of 1 −
f = 1/100-th of the expected migration ({L′′} − {L}) where by f we denote the degree
of frictions arising out of socio-cultural reasons. We can approximate the labor respones
to productivity shocks linearly around the equilibrium. To generate a response of the
observed magnitude, we need shocks of similar order i.e. (1 − f ) fraction of the original.
Let us denote the excess gain in utility by ∆,
∆ =
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
ln Zˆ jn − βlnLˆn
)
. (3.69)
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Remeber that following the convention of the hat notation, we can write the change as
xˆ =
xnew
xold
= 1 + ∆x, (3.70)
where ∆x = xnew − xold. Therefore linearizing Eqn. 3.69 we get
∆ =
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
(1 + ∆Z jn) − β(1 + ∆Ln)
)
. (3.71)
Then with the necessary frictions of order f , we have the response to shocks {Z′} as
∆ f =
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
(1 + (1 − f ).∆Z jn) − β(1 + (1 − f ).∆Ln)
)
,
= ∆ − f .
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j(∆Z jn − β∆L jn). (3.72)
Therefore, we can write the product of the first two terms in Eqn. 3.65 as
U |{Z},{L}
U |{Z′′},{L′′}
U |{Z′},{L′}
U |{Z},{L} = 1 − f .
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j(∆Z jn − β∆Ln). (3.73)
Here again we have used an approximation that
lim
∆→0,x→0
1 + ∆ + x
1 + ∆
≈ 1 + x, (3.74)
Eqn. 3.6 states that the utility level across all islands in equilibrium is given by the real
income,
U |{Z},{L} = InPn , (3.75)
where
In = rn
Kn
Ln
+ wn. (3.76)
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Therefore, we can write the third term in Eqn. 3.65 as
U |{Z′′},{L′}
U |{Z′},{L′} =
In/Pn|{Z′′},{L′}
In/Pn|{Z′},{L′} (3.77)
We rewrite Eqn. 3.77 as
U |{Z′′},{L′}
U |{Z′},{L′} =
w′′n L′n+r′′n Kn
P′′n
w′nL′n+r′nKn
P′n
,
=
(
w′′n L
′
n + r
′′
n Kn
w′nL′n + r′nKn
) (
P′n
P′′n
)
. (3.78)
Note that the shock process {Z′} is (1 − f ) fraction of {Z′′}. Thus in the numerator and
the denominator of the left hand side of Eqn. 3.78, we have idential labor and capital
allocation. In the numerator the factor prices and the final goods prices respond to a bigger
productivity shocks {Z′′} compared to those in the denominator. This shock affects all
prices implying that the effect of the first term is offset by the effect on the second term
which moves exactly in the opposite direction. The intuition is that if factors do not adjust,
then the general effect of i.i.d. productivity shocks across islands will be approximately
zero.
Therefore, the loss of utility due to frictions can be written as
∆U
U
≈ U |{Z′′},{L′}
U |{Z′′},{L′′} − 1,
= − f .
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j(∆Z jn − β∆L jn). (3.79)
To get an estimate of the welfare loss, let us assume that
∆L jn = k.∆Z
j
n, (3.80)
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where k is a constant from the model implying that we can rewrite the welfare equation as
∆U/∆Z
U/Z
= − f (1 − kβ), (3.81)
with the steady state value of the shock Z = 1. Assume k = 1 i.e. for TFP shocks in
the order of x%, total mass of migrants would be of the same magnitude. Recalling that
β = 0.3, f = 0.99, we get
∆U/∆Z
U/Z
= −.7. (3.82)
Thus for TFP shocks in the order of 3%, the wellfare loss would be of order 2%.
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3.7.6 Regression results with robust errors
In this section, we redo all the regressions with robust standard errors. See Tables 3.9,
3.10, 3.11 and 3.12.
Table 3.9: Regression results with robust errors for EU - Nominal
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept R2
2000 0.05836∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.7808
2001 0.05870∗∗∗ 0.00002∗∗ 0.00000 0.7700
2002 0.06118∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.7794
2003 0.05456∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.6468
2004 0.05709∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.5938
2005 0.06132∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.6788
2006 0.06376∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.6927
2007 0.06030∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.7450
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 3.10: Regression results with robust errors for EU - Relative
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept R2
2000 0.84328∗∗∗ 0.01700∗∗∗ -0.00046 0.7808
2001 0.83180∗∗∗ 0.01779∗∗ -0.00042 0.7700
2002 0.85237∗∗∗ 0.01418∗∗∗ -0.00013 0.7794
2003 0.79403∗∗∗ 0.01494∗∗ 0.00063 0.6468
2004 0.77543∗∗∗ 0.01344∗∗ 0.00116 0.5938
2005 0.81675∗∗∗ 0.01351∗∗ 0.00052 0.6788
2006 0.75724∗∗∗ 0.01441∗∗ 0.00122 0.6927
2007 0.71356∗∗∗ 0.01980∗∗ 0.00104 0.7450
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 3.11: Regression results with robust errors for US
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept R2
Nominal 0.82695∗∗∗ 0.00006∗∗∗ 0.00000
0.6305
Relative 0.68521∗∗∗ 0.00243∗∗∗ 0.00004
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 3.12: Regression results with robust errors for EU - frictions
Contiguity LangIndex Indivi Pragm Euro FinRiskInd ShadowEco Intercept R2
2000 0.23∗ 0.38∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.05 0.02 -0.01∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.5115
2001 0.26∗∗ 0.36∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗ -0.06 0.02∗ -0.01∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.5245
2002 0.21∗ 0.39∗∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.12∗ -0.07 0.02 -0.01∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.4955
2003 0.22∗ 0.48∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.06 0.03∗ -0.01∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.5075
2004 0.18 0.52∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.13∗∗ -0.06 0.02∗∗ -0.01 0.67∗∗ 0.4870
2005 0.18 0.45∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.06 0.02∗ -0.01∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.4726
2006 0.18 0.54∗∗ -0.07∗ -0.08∗ -0.09 0.01 -0.01∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.4017
2007 0.16 0.56∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.10∗ -0.19∗∗ 0.02 -0.02∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.4580
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
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3.7.7 Panel Regression results
In this section, we carry out panel estimation of the prediction and the data. See tables
3.13, 3.14.
Table 3.13: Panel regression result for EU - Nominal
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
TFP driven migration 0.061∗∗
(0.004)
Contiguity 0.000∗∗
(0.000)
Intercept 0.000
(0.000)
N 528
χ2(2) 258.821
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Table 3.14: Panel regression result for EU - Relative
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
TFP driven migration 0.664∗∗
(0.040)
Contiguity 0.015∗∗
(0.004)
Intercept 0.003
(0.002)
N 528
χ2(2) 276.957
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Table 3.15: Panel regression result for EU - frictions
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Contiguity 0.210∗∗
(0.077)
LangIndex 0.476∗∗
(0.146)
Individualism -0.099∗∗
(0.035)
Pragmatism -0.083∗
(0.033)
Euro -0.002
(0.016)
Financial risk 0.000
(0.002)
Shadow Econ -0.003
(0.005)
Intercept 0.494∗∗
(0.157)
N 528
χ2(7) 43.308
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3.7.8 Additional Plots
We would like to understand the influence of each variable which is used as friction. We
use the post-estimation tool partial regression plot for this. In the dyad regression the
dependent variable is the ratio of bilateral migration as seen in data to bilateral migration
which is TFP driven (simulated). We try to understand the importance of each variable, for
example language index - for this we first regress the dependent variable on the remaining
regressors (not including language index) and plot the residuals on the Y-axis. Next we
regress language index on the remaining regressors and plot the residuals on the X-axis.
These plots show relation between the dependent variable and each friction variable.
We use the component plus residual plot (partial residual plot) to get more clarity on
the functional form of the relation between the dependent variable and friction variables
1-by-1. For example to understand the relation between the ratio of bilateral migration in
data to TFP driven bilateral migration (y-variable) to language index we first regress y on
all the x variables. Then we subtract the effect of all the other regressors (not language
index) from the y-variable and plot that on the Y-axis.We call this component plus residual.
We compare it with the language index which is plotted on theX-axis.
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Figure 3.13: The partial regression plot for all the variables in 2000
Figure 3.14: The partial regression plot for all the variables in 2007
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Figure 3.15: The partial residual plot for language index in 2007
3.7.9 Explanation of Individualism and Pragmatism
We use the Hofstede index to measure cultural differences in the European countries. We
consider the following indices -
• Indulgence
• Pragmatism
• Uncertainty Avoidance
• Masculinity
• Individualism
• Power distance
Out of these ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘Individualism’ most meaningfully explained the frictions.
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Hofstede [2015] define ‘Individualism’ as “The fundamental issue addressed by this
dimension is the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its members. It has
to do with whether people’s self-image is defined in terms of “I” or “We”. In Individualist
societies people are supposed to look after themselves and their direct family only. In
Collectivist societies people belong to in groups that take care of them in exchange for
loyalty.”
‘Pragmatism’ as “This dimension describes how every society has to maintain some
links with its own past while dealing with the challenges of the present and future, and
societies prioritise these two existential goals differently. Normative societies who score
low on this dimension, for example, prefer to maintain time-honoured traditions and norms
while viewing societal change with suspicion. Those with a culture which scores high, on
the other hand, take a more pragmatic approach: they encourage thrift and efforts in
modern education as a way to prepare for the future.”
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Table 3.16: Cultural index data
Country Individualism Pragmatism
Austria 55 60
Belgium 75 82
Denmark 74 35
Spain 51 48
Germany 67 83
Czech Republic 58 70
Finland 63 38
France 71 63
Italy 76 61
Hungary 80 58
Ireland 70 24
Netherlands 80 67
Sweden 71 53
Slovenia 27 49
United Kingdom 89 51
Norway 69 35
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